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                                                         ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and the Japanese Defense Industrial Base 
(JDIB) are in a transitory period.  A recession in the Japanese economy, and an 
increasing requirement for participation by the Japanese military in regional and global 
venues has placed unprecedented demands on the JDA.  The Department of Defense also 
finds itself in a transformational period wherein implementation of acquisition reform 
initiatives is an imperative.  Given this environment, this thesis seeks to both provide 
DoD Program Managers with a baseline economic analysis of the Japanese Defense 
Industry and identify potential synergies in U.S. - Japan acquisition efforts.  An 
exposition of the Japanese Defense Industry's composition and status, and a targeted 
comparison to U.S. defense firms frames the current acquisition environment.  Economic 
factors at work in U.S. - Japan acquisition efforts are identified through examination of 
past and current acquisition interfaces such as:  the FS-X aircraft co-development 
program, and the Theater Missile Defense program.  Specific and general acquisition 
opportunities are discussed, and an assessment tool for evaluation of collaboration 
alternatives is proposed.  This thesis finds that acquisition opportunities do exist for DoD 
within the JDIB and optimization of these opportunities can facilitate DoD's effort to 
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the Japanese Defense Industrial Base 
(JDIB), determine what economic factors have influenced the United States Department 
of Defense (DoD) in past acquisition projects with Japan, and model the impact of 
economic factors on future acquisition opportunities.  The specific goal of this research is 
to provide DoD Acquisition Program Managers with a baseline analysis that will 
facilitate the identification of future best-value acquisition opportunities within the JDIB.  
B. BACKGROUND 
"Japan's defense budget, at around $46 billion, is the world's fifth largest; it 
annually imports over $2 billion worth of equipment from the United States." [Ref. 41 p. 
1].  Japan is also major player in the globalization of the civil-military industrial base.  
The United States can ill afford to ignore Japan as a cost-effective source of supply for 
military weapon systems and technologies.  
Concurrent with Japan's growth as a global player in the military weapons arena, 
DoD continues to move forward with numerous acquisition initiatives.  These acquisition 
initiatives include reducing both initial acquisition cost, and Total Ownership Cost 
(TOC).  The JDIB might prove to be a prime market for innovative technologies that 
could help to reduce acquisition cost and TOC. 
DoD has already recognized the need for an integrated civil-military industrial 
base vice promoting a defense-unique industrial base.  The next step in this process is to 
"globalize" the civil-military industrial base in order to increase competitiveness, increase 
the opportunity for strategic partnerships, and create an overall best value for DoD.  The 
JDIB has the potential to be a major player in this global market and become DoD's 
strategic partner (or competitor).   
 A history of past acquisition interactions between the U.S. and Japan depicts a 
mixed bag of successful and not-so-successful projects.  While there is no clear 
agreement on the reasons for either success or failure, a few central themes are present: 
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-Current Japanese policy severely inhibits (though it does not entirely prohibit) 
the export of military weapon systems.  In the last two decades this policy has been 
progressively revised.  Revisions of this policy have enabled greater interaction between 
the U.S. and Japan on defense-related projects. 
-Japanese industry views indigenous military production as an activity with very 
low potential profits.  This view results in Japanese military products that are generally 
considered inferior to the military weapons production produced by other industrialized 
nations (e.g. the U.S. and the European Union (E.U.)). 
-The Japanese government will usually favor domestic defense 
procurement/production in order to sustain certain defense sectors (e.g. military 
aerospace), even when this action results in delivering to the Japanese military a lower 
quality product at a higher cost (i.e. a better quality product might have been imported at 
a lower cost). 
-The Japanese government is willing to make exceptions to arms export and 
production policies for the U.S.  This willingness to make exceptions for the U.S. may 
prove to be a comparative economic advantage. 
These four themes share a common thread in that they identify the delicate 
balance between Japanese policy imperatives (i.e. pacifism, regional stability), the need 
for national security, and the growing globalization of the defense industry.  This work 
seeks, in part, to identify some of the economic aspects of this balance and explore how 
DoD might create or encourage defense industry cooperation that is advantageous to both 
countries.    
The issues of how and when to conduct acquisition interfaces with Japan are 
highly relevant in today's acquisition environment.  In a September 2000 speech to the 
Defense Acquisition and Procurement Seminar in Singapore; the Deputy Director of 
Strategic and Tactical Systems for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, & Logistics)-Dr. Paris Genalis, stated that the preferred model for future 
industrial consolidation is:   
...what we might call a "competitive, international industrial model, 
characterized by industrial linkages of multiple firms effectively 
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competing in all markets - and sharing technology.  In this (preferred) 
model, the benefits of competition are realized; large markets are opened 
up to transnational firms; and proliferation incentives are significantly 
reduced. [Ref. 16 p. 6].    
 Dr. Genalis concludes his speech by noting that:   
Industrial globalization is taking place, with very little likelihood that we 
could-or should-do anything to delay or prevent it...we must embrace it, 
without looking back, with an eye to making it serve both our industrial 
needs and our security strategies. [Ibid p. 7]. 
In 2002, the worldwide defense industry is increasingly competitive across a 
broad spectrum of firms.  DoD Acquisition Program Managers can take advantage of one 
aspect of this global defense marketplace by understanding the Japanese defense industry.  
Program Managers may assess the Japanese defense industry as a potential competitor or 
a strategic partner and use this assessment to guide their acquisition decisions.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.   Primary Research Question 
The primary research question explored in this thesis is:  What acquisition 
opportunities exist for DoD within the JDIB?  The research is designed so as to enable an 
exploration of the JDIB that focuses on identification of key factors that create or inhibit 
acquisition opportunities for DoD. 
2.   Secondary Research Questions 
The secondary research questions explored in this thesis are:   
-What are the similarities and differences between the JDIB and the   
 USDIB? 
-What economic factors have influenced past US-Japan acquisition   
 projects? 
-What are the most likely areas for future acquisition interface with the   
 JDIB? 
-How can DoD Program Managers evaluate the costs and benefits of  
engaging in acquisition projects with the JDIB? 
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-The secondary research questions are structured so as to:  (1) enable the 
definition of the JDIB; (2) identify and analyze any economic factors at work in US-
Japan acquisition interfaces; and then (3) identify specific economic objectives that may 
facilitate the evaluation of acquisition opportunities in pursuit of the primary research 
question. 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis examines the composition and status of the JDIB and makes a targeted 
comparison between the JDIB and the USDIB to provide a frame of reference for DoD 
Program Managers.  Once the JDIB is compared to the USDIB, the research effort 
focuses on an analysis of economic aspects in past and on-going U.S. - Japan acquisition 
interfaces.  Next, specific and general acquisition opportunities are identified and a tool is 
presented for use as modified cost-benefit analysis of acquisition opportunities to 
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of collaborative acquisition projects with 
Japan.  In the final chapter, conclusions and recommendations are made concerning how 
best to implement future acquisition interfaces with Japan. 
While issues of national security and policy are present in this examination of the 
defense industrial base, no attempt is made to comment upon these policies, save for the 
impact of these policies upon arms sales and arms export activities.  In addition, this 
work will not focus on an examination of the USDIB, except as to provide some 
comparative reference for the reader.  Finally, this thesis does not undertake an overall 
examination of either the DoD acquisition process or the details of past US-Japan 
acquisition interfaces.  Rather, this thesis focuses on identification and evaluation of 
economic forces at work in selected acquisition interfaces.  The research assumption is 
that identification and evaluation of any economic forces present (or absent) in past and 
on-going acquisition interfaces can help to define future acquisition opportunities. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consists of the following six steps:  
-Step 1:  Conduct a literature search of books, magazine articles, journals,   




-Step 2:  Evaluate the impact of any economic factors on past, and on-going, 
acquisition interfaces.  
-Step 3:  Identify specific and general acquisition opportunities for    
 DoD. 
-Step 4:  Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of undertaking acquisition   
 projects with the JDIB. 
-Step 5:  Conduct a review of applicable Acquisition Regulations    
 beginning with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).   
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II surveys the JDIB and compares it to the USDIB.  The USDIB and 
JDIB are compared to highlight the similarities and differences between the two defense 
industries.  Chapter II concludes with an examination of how the JDIB interacts with its 
own military and how this interaction affects overall JDIB expansion opportunities and 
its competitiveness in the world market. 
Chapter III examines the economic factors present in U.S. - Japan acquisition 
interfaces. The focus of this chapter is to identify and evaluate the key economic factors 
that may influence future U.S. - Japan acquisition projects.  This chapter concludes with 
the identification of four economic factors that influenced U.S. - Japan acquisition 
interfaces 
Chapter IV identifies specific and general acquisition opportunities for DoD.  In 
Chapter IV the researcher presents a tool for assessment of collaborative acquisition 
projects.  This tool is a modified form of cost-benefit analysis.  In a sample application, 
the tool is applied to a past U.S. - Japan acquisition interface (the FS-X).  This Chapter 
concludes with a discussion of alternative assessment tools and a discussion of 
opportunities for acquisition policy development.     
In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn, and recommendations are made as to 
how DoD should attempt to conduct future acquisition interface with Japan.  Chapter V 
also briefly outlines areas for further research in the collaborative acquisition process. 
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G. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
     This study will provide DoD Acquisition Program Managers with a baseline 
analysis that will facilitate identification of acquisition opportunities within the JDIB and 
contribute to lower initial acquisition costs and lower TOC for future defense 




II. ANALYSIS OF THE JDIB 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese defense industry experienced significant change in the last quarter 
of the 20th century.  Perhaps the most pivotal event in the recent history of the Japanese 
defense industry was the fall of the USSR, which caused Japan to undertake a 
fundamental reassessment of its defense posture.  Japan determined that it did not need to 
spend as much on defense as it had spent during the Cold War-"double-digit defense 
spending increases that were common in the 1980s (were) replaced by annual increases 
lower than present inflation rates, resulting in negative real growth in the country's 
defense budget." [Ref. 6 p. 369].  This cut in defense spending has severely impacted 
defense acquisition as well:   
... Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 1991 represented the last substantial hike in 
(defense) spending...Procurement programs in particular dropped 
dramatically (during 1993-1997).  Procurement funding represented 28 
percent of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) budget in JFY 1989; by 
JFY 1996, that had dropped to 18.9 percent. [Ibid pp. 376-378].   
However, Japan still recognizes the need for strong national defense and a strong 
defense industry. 
In "Country Survey XIII:  Japan's Security Posture and Defense Industry 
Prospects," Michael Chinworth notes that, despite real reductions in defense spending, an 
examination of current defense budgets "at average exchange rates for the present period 
(1997), Japan ranks in the top five in terms of military spending globally, a surprisingly 
high level for a country committed to minimizing its defense spending." [Ibid p.378].   
There are funds available for defense-related procurement in Japan, despite declining 
budgets.  The JDIB is considering expansion "into overseas markets to offset declining 
domestic markets." [Ibid p. 369].   To fully understand what expansion into "overseas 
markets" actually means for the JDIB, we must first appreciate the constraints faced by 
the JDIB. 
In this chapter, the current restraints on the JDIB are explored, and the current 
composition and status of the JDIB is outlined and defined.  The current composition and 
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status of the USDIB is also defined (in a limited scope) primarily to facilitate an 
economic comparison to the JDIB.  This economic comparison is intended to provide a 
relative benchmark for the reader and enable an initial awareness of the potential 
synergies and dissimilarities of the defense industries of the two countries.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the interface between the JDIB and the Japanese Self-
Defense Force (JSDF) and the implications of this interface on the future growth and 
direction of the JDIB.  A summary of key facts about the JDIB is provided at  
Appendix A. 
B. CURRENT RESTRAINTS ON THE JDIB AND EXCEPTIONS TO THOSE 
RESTRAINTS 
The JDIB faces a number of restraints in its ability to manufacture, sell, and 
distribute arms.  This section outlines current restraints on the JDIB.  These restraints are 
not absolute, however, and the last topic in this section outlines exceptions to these 
restraints. 
1. Three Principles on the Prohibition of Arms Export 
In 1962 the Japanese government established what became known as the "Three 
Principles" on Arms Export.  The "Three Principles" were further amended in 1976.  In 
their current form the "Three Principles" state that: 
The export of arms shall be prohibited to: (1) Communist bloc countries; 
(2) Countries to which the export of arms is prohibited under U.N. 
resolution; (3) Countries involved in or likely to become involved in 
international conflict; (4) The export of arms to other areas shall be 
restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution, and (5) Equipment 
related to arms production shall be treated as if it were arms. [Ref. 22 p. 
91]. 
 In sum, these principles would seem to relegate the JDIB to purely internal 
defense production.  Indeed, the "Three Principles" were intended to mirror Japan's 
overall "defensive" military posture.  However, Japan's mutual defense relationship with 
the United States, recent economic woes, and the failure of Soviet communism, have all 
contributed to changing these principles.  The United States, in particular, is seen as a 
strategic partner to Japan's defense industry rather than as a "country involved in or likely 
to be involved in international conflict." [Ibid p. 91]. 
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2. Exceptions to Restraints 
In 1983, seven years after revision of the Three Principles, Japan decided to "open 
the way for the transfer of its military technology to the United States as an exception to 
the Three Principles on Arms Exports..." [Ref. 15 p. 132].  This "exception" on arms 
export has manifested itself in the form of nine cooperative research projects between the 
U.S. and Japan.  These nine research projects1 are: 
(1) Ducted Rocket Engine, (2) Advanced Steel technology (for submarine hulls), 
(3) Combat Vehicle Replacement, (4) Eye-safe Laser Radar, (5) Improved Ejection Seats 
(pilot restraint devices and seat stabilizing equipment), (6) Advance Hybrid Propulsion 
technology (solid fuel with liquid oxidizers), (7) Shallow-sea Region Acoustic 
Technology, (8) Ballistic Missile Defense Technology, and (9) High-safety gunpowder 
for Field Artillery (designed to reduce the occurrence of in-bore explosions). [Ibid p. 
132]. 
This cooperative research effort is just one example of Japan's willingness to 
make exceptions for the United States in the area of arms research and production.  
Another notable effort is the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) 
between Japan and the United States. 
The ACSA took effect in October 1996.  The ACSA's basic principle is that "if 
either side requests the provision of goods or services the other side should provide those 
goods and services.2" [Ibid p.  132].  The ACSA was initially applied to "joint exercises, 
UN Peace-Keeping Operations and international humanitarian relief operations." [Ibid 
p.132].  This agreement was further revised and, as of September 1999, the ACSA also 
covers "measures for dealing with situations in areas surrounding Japan." [Ibid p. 128].  
The ASCA further erodes barriers to acquisition interface between the U.S. and Japan; 
however, the 1999 amendment does specifically prohibit the JSDF from providing 
weapons or ammunition.   
                                                 
1 A brief description of each project is contained in Appendix B. 
2 "Goods and services" are defined by the Japanese Defense Agency as: food, water, billeting, 
transportation (including airlift), POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) clothing, communications, 
decontamination services, base support storage, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and 
components, repairs and maintenance, and airport and seaport services.   
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The provision that support by Japanese forces only occur in areas surrounding 
Japan has also seen revision as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the 
United States.  During October 2001: 
the Japanese government approved legislation that would allow its troops 
to give logistical support to America and its allies in military operations 
overseas...the legislation has a clause which causes this exception to 
expire in two years, however, support for the measure was strong 
throughout Japan. [Ref. 6 p. 1]. 
DoD Acquisition Program Managers should note that there are already a number 
of U.S. - Japan defense-related interfaces in place within the overall Japanese defense 
establishment.  The U.S. is given special consideration with respect to arms export 
policies and defense-related interactions.  This exception may create a comparative 
advantage for DoD when competing contracts for support of weapons systems or in the 
Research and Development phase of weapon system’s design.  DoD Acquisition Program 
Mangers should recognize that, despite the presence of the "Three Principles," the JDIB 
might be considered in a number of acquisition venues.  In order to fully appreciate the 
possible avenues for acquisition opportunities, the Program Manager must first 
understand the composition of the JDIB. 
 
C. CURRENT COMPOSITION AND STATUS OF THE JDIB 
1.   Composition 
The JDIB is "dominated by twelve companies that account for approximately 95 
percent of the JDA's acquisition budget." [Ref. 41 p. 2].  These twelve companies (and 




Defense Company Name Primary Defense-Related 
Emphasis 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) Ships, military vehicles, aircraft*, 
and missiles 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. Ships and aircraft  
(primarily helicopters) 
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Co., 
Ltd. 
Ships and engines 
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Electronics and Missiles 
Toshiba Corporation Electronics and Missiles 
NEC Corporation Electronics 
Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. Aircraft 
The Japan Steel Works, Ltd. Artillery 
Komatsu, Ltd. Small arms/ordnance and military 
vehicles 
Hitachi, Ltd. Electronics and military vehicles 
Oki Electric Industry Co., Ltd. Electronics 
Daikin Industries, Ltd. Small arms/ordnance 
Table 1. Twelve Leading Japanese Defense Companies  
[From:  Ref. 41 p. 2] 
*MHI is Japan's sole producer of fixed- wing fighter aircraft 
The defense industry only accounts for about 0.6% of Japan's domestic 
production.  Although this is a small percentage, it still amounted to an R&D and 
procurement budget of about $10 billion in JFY 1999 (April 1999-March 2000).  In 
concert with these twelve companies, the JDA normally procures defense items through 
one of the following five sources:  "(1) domestic development, (2) co-development with 
the United States, (3), Licensed Production, (4) Commercial Imports, and (5) Foreign 
Military Sales.  The twelve companies are heavily involved in licensed production 
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particularly, with U.S. firms" [Ibid p. 1].  It is noteworthy that a significant portion of the 
($10 billon) R&D and procurement budget is:  
devoted to only four very expensive programs:  the Multiple Launch 
Rocket System (MLRS), the AWACS airborne early warning system, the 
Mitsubishi/Lockheed Martin F-2 air superiority fighter aircraft (formerly 
called the FSX), and the AEGIS guided missile cruiser.  All of these are 
being either license-produced, imported, or jointly developed with the 
United States. [Ibid pp. 1-2].   
The limited composition and constrained nature of the JDIB has significant ramifications 
for its current status and portends change in the near future if the Japanese government 
wants to maintain a relatively robust and diverse defense industrial capability.  
  2. Status 
The JDIB faces consistently declining defense budgets and a constrained market 
structure (as described earlier).  The general attitude among the major defense companies 
is that the JDIB must simply try to survive this fiscally austere period.  As a result of this 
survivalist mentality, the JDIB consistently supports Japanese government initiatives to 
"rationalize the domestic arms industry.” [Ref. 6 p. 392].  "Rationalize" has become "a 
code word for providing more subsidies to maintain excess capacity until the present 
dearth of new orders passes (whenever that day arrives)." [Ibid  p. 392].  A subsidized 
defense market may not be the most economical solution for the JDIB and DoD might 
facilitate implementation of some incentives to reduce Japanese government subsidies by 
encouraging corporate partnerships with U.S. defense firms. 
The United States is viewed as the most likely market for sales of Japanese 
defense products, primarily due to the constitutional exception to arms exports discussed 
earlier.  The effort to sell defense products to the U.S. has been warmly received by DoD: 
At a higher level within the Defense Department, officials are examining 
long-term options that range from expanded use of contract research 
programs to joint production of common components and even expanded 
purchases of Japanese components to further the objectives of gaining 
access to Japanese technologies, maintaining common systems, and 
controlling weapon systems costs.  It is not an exaggeration to assert that 
DoD is more committed to mutually beneficial relationship.  Most of these 
initiatives include some measure of government activism and support.  
Defense officials in the United States, however, seek an environment in 
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which company-to-company interactions will increasingly define 
technology opportunities for the two countries. [Ibid p. 392].    
This initiative by DoD has received a lukewarm response from the JDIB.  Most 
"defense producers seem more interested in new production programs that will increase 
orders than in research programs involving possible cost/risk sharing and long term 
horizons lacking any guarantees of moving into production." [Ibid p. 392].  This 
lukewarm response may be the result of DoD not properly structuring incentives for 
companies in both countries.  The nature and structure of defense production incentives is 
examined in the next chapter.   
The JDIB has undertaken internal measures to improve defense productivity and 
achieving best value defense procurement solutions.  The industry is moving unilaterally 
(vis-à-vis the Japanese government) to minimize risks and cut costs.  "A few major firms 
have consolidated their defense divisions into new, jointly-owned ventures to reduce 
costs and minimize risks associated with remaining active in declining markets" [Ibid p. 
388].  For example, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries and Sumitomo Heavy 
Industries established "equal partnership in an engineering firm to handle research and 
development, design and life-cycle support for naval vessels" [Ibid p. 388].  This effort 
will only have a limited effect, however, in that it is actually a reorganization and 
downsizing of the excess capacity that was present in the market.  While potentially 
effective, these measures will not eliminate the continued need for foreign defense 
products. 
Historically, over 50 percent of Japanese defense imports will come from the 
United States.   However, the Japanese government imports defense items in other 
markers.   Japan sometimes conducts defense acquisition with suppliers in the European 
Union (E.U.).  An example of this effort is the joint venture between "French-German 
manufacturer Eurocopter and Kawasaki Heavy Industries of the EC-145/BK-117 multi-
use helicopter." [Ref. 15 p. 1]. This highly-successful helicopter project launched its 
second version in 2001 with a "pre-production order quantity of 40 aircraft." [Ibid p. 1].  
Japan’s willingness to use E.U. sources for defense contracts creates the potential for the 
United States and Japan to become competitors in the European defense market.  A 
 14
 
competitive European defense market creates a new dynamic in defense procurement for 
both the United States and Japan that may enable creation of strategic threats and 
strategic opportunities for the JDIB. 
In summary, the JDIB is a relatively small industry that counts upon government 
subsidies and domestic defense production to maintain both capacity and capability.  
Defense-related production is seen as a low-profit/no-profit venture and is not considered 
a major factor in most firms' revenue streams.  The "Three Principles on Arms Export" 
still effectively exist, but are often favorably interpreted for U.S.-related defense projects.  
The United States is given preferential treatment as a supplier and customer in the 
Japanese defense market (although some items are purchased or co-produced with EU 
member nations) and licensed production of U.S. defense items is viewed as an 
acceptable substitute when domestic production is not possible.  The Cooperative 
Research Effort, the ASCA, and post-September 11th legislation are all prime indicators 
that Japan and its defense industry are willing to pursue cooperative efforts in the area of 
defense production.  A key element of any cooperative effort is interface with the 
USDIB.   The USDIB shares some similarities with the JDIB and an overview of the 
USDIB provides a comparative reference.  This overview is undertaken in the next 
section. 
D. CURRENT COMPOSITION AND STATUS OF THE USDIB 
  1. Composition 
The top 15 U.S. Defense Contractors account for about 44% of all DoD contracts 
(about $52.3 billion).  While the U.S. defense industry is more diverse (in terms of the 
number of companies), there are only about twelve companies that routinely obtain more 
than one percent of DoD contracts in a given year.  The top 12 defense companies for FY 




Defense Company Name* Primary Defense-Related Emphasis 
Lockheed Martin Corporation Aircraft and Missiles 
Boeing Company, Inc. Aircraft 
Raytheon Company, Inc. Missiles 
General Dynamics Ships and submarines 
Northrop Grumman Aircraft 
United Technologies Aircraft and Helicopter Engines 
Litton Industries, Inc. Ships 
General Electric Aircraft and Helicopter Engines 
TRW Inc. Electronic systems and support 
Textron, Inc Tilt-rotor aircraft, tank engines, 
helicopters 
Science Applications International Programmic, logistical and technical 
support 
The Carlyle Group Ordnance, fighting vehicles 
Table 2. Top Twelve United States Defense Companies (FY 1999)  
[From:  Ref. 20 pp. 1] 
*Recent mergers may render this list inaccurate, an updated list may be obtained from the 
website listed at Reference 20.  
The overall USDIB encompasses many more firms than the 12 companies listed 
in Table 2.  It is important to note, however, that despite the relative breadth of the 
defense industry (in terms of number of companies) its overall health is dependent on the 
viability of the large corporations at the top of the industry.  Only the very large 
corporations possess the capital necessary to undertake large defense projects and many 
smaller defense-related companies are almost wholly dependent upon subcontracts from 




The United States spends about three percent of its GDP on its defense budget (as 
opposed to less than one percent for Japan).  The total U.S. defense budget for FY 2002, 
at approximately $275 billion, represents a marked increase in defense spending.  
However, throughout the 1990s, the United States defense budget was in relative decline 
with little money available for large-scale re-capitalization.  Thus, the U.S. defense 
industry began to restructure itself. 
Until very recently, the USDIB was faced with the prospects of consistently 
declining defense budgets (particularly the procurement portion of the budget) and 
chronic overcapacity.  The capacity problem was mitigated by a number of mergers and 
acquisitions among defense companies during the 1990s.  This merging of players within 
the USDIB could create an oligopoly of defense suppliers within the USDIB and inhibit 
DoD's ability to competitively award defense contracts to U.S. firms.  DoD tends to 
downplay the impact of defense industry mergers on competition.  The Office of the 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial Policy has stated:  "Defense industry 
consolidation and restructuring will probably continue (into the 2000-2010 decade), 
although differently than we saw during the 1990s, which was characterized by mergers 
and acquisitions by the largest defense firms as they became larger...(however) the 
defense industrial base continues to be a competitive environment which promotes cost 
savings and competition." [Ref. 32 pp. 1-2].    
  DoD has not always downplayed the effects of U.S. defense industry 
consolidation.  During 1993-1998, DoD advocated defense industry mergers and 
acquisitions as a way to realize cost savings for both the industry and the USG.  
"Unfortunately, the sharing of these cost savings between government and the companies 
intended by DoD policy and anticipated by defense firms did not happen......" [Ref. 22 p. 
140].    In 1998, DoD essentially reversed course when it turned down the proposed 
acquisition of Northrop by Lockheed Martin and "the proposed acquisition by (a re-
emergent) General Dynamics of Newport News Shipbuilding.  But DoD did not indicate 
whether further downsizing was necessary and if so, how it was to be achieved" [Ibid p.  
141].    The USDIB seems to be left with no clear direction about consolidation.  The 
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consolidation problem is not likely to be resolved in the near future and despite recent 
increases in defense spending, it appears unlikely the USDIB will remain at its current 
size. 
In an effort to ameliorate some of the effects of shrinkage in the defense market, 
the USDIB has looked to other areas for revenue:   
- The "industry has aggressively expanded its share of the international arms 
market, but the potential here is limited by export controls on the most desirable high-
performance systems and by the shrinking size of this market." [Ibid p. 143]. 
- The USDIB looks to the E.U. for defense customers.  However, the EU also has 
"too much industrial base for anticipated defense needs" [Ibid p. 143], and this market 
does not present itself as able to absorb the current overcapacity in the USDIB. 
- The U.S. "defense and aerospace companies have been aggressively seeking 
ways to enter commercial markets.  An individual company may or may not be 
successful in this effort; the record indicates that larger companies will find it difficult to 
be competitive" [Ibid p.  143]. 
The USDIB is aggressively seeking new markets for its products.  However, each 
venue represents difficulties that ultimately indicate that the USDIB will need to find 
other methods to deal with chronic overcapacity.  Interaction with the JDIB (with DoD as 
an enabler) appears to be an attractive addition to the venues outline here.   
The USDIB is comprised of many large and small firms.  However, most large 
defense contracts are dominated by a collection of 12-15 major defense contractors.  
These U.S. defense contractors participate in an industry that is increasingly diverse and 
highly-competitive.  This market has the potential to include Japanese contractors to a 
greater extent than the current level of interaction.  DoD Program Managers should 
understand the similarities and differences between the JDIB and USDIB to fully enable 
cooperation and create best value results.  A comparison of the JDIB and USDIB is 
undertaken in the next section. 
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E. COMPARISON OF THE JDIB AND USDIB 
The following section compares the JDIB and USDIB in four areas:  competition, 
market structure, key governmental issues, and growth potential.  The purpose of this 
section is to outline similarities and differences between the two defense industrial bases 
and provide a baseline for further examination of economic issues that impact interaction 
between the industries.  This examination begins with a look at competition in each 
industrial base. 
1. Competition 
a. Overall Competitive Environment 
The JDIB has essentially no intra-industry competition.  Contracts are 
awarded in a basically non-competitive environment and the awards usually make up 
only a small percentage of the companies' yearly revenue.   
(One) of the peculiarities of Japanese defense contracting (is that) most 
contracts (in terms of value) are awarded without competitive tendering 
through a procurement committee to individual contractors.  The most 
common form of procurement contract is the firm-fixed price (FFP) plus a 
variable fee.  The allowable items for determining costs in these 
negotiated contracts (competitive bidding is rare) are more generous than 
those usually seen in comparable U.S. procurement contracts, raising the 
price of military equipment to the Defense Agency and subsidizing the 
domestic industry......Non-competitive awards comprised 97.4 percent of 
all JDA contracts in value in JFY 1996. [Ref. 6 p. 381].  
In comparison, the U.S. defense industry is highly-competitive.  Although 
the industry has consolidated, competition remains a key element of the industry.  In FY 
1997, non-competitive awards comprised only 30.4 percent of all procurement contracts 
that were available for competition. [Ref. 13 p. 1].  While intra-industry competition is 
keen within the USDIB, U.S. defense firms also aggressively compete in foreign markets. 
b. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
The FMS market for the USDIB is a multi-billion dollar industry.  Table 3 
(below) provides data on the top 15 FMS (U.S.) Contractors in 1999: 
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TOTAL PURCHASES $6,216,712,000 




1 Boeing Co. $1,417,288 22.80% 
2 Lockheed Martin Corp. 1,079,327 17.36 
3 Raytheon Co. 813,537 13.09 
4 United Technologies Corp. 265,131 4.26 
5 Textron Inc. 201,337 3.24 
6 Science Applications Intl. Corp. 155,007 2.49 
7 Northrop Grumman Corp. 148,732 2.39 
8 General Electric Co. 139,308 2.24 
9 Mobil Corp. 97,655 1.57 
10 VSE Corp 97,298 1.57 
11 TRW Corp. 90,329 1.45 
12 BDM Corp. 77,001 1.24 
13 Rolls Royce PLC 71,976 1.16 
14 Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc. 68,098 1.10 
15 Rockwell International Corp. 64,333 1.03 
Table 3. 1999 Foreign Military Sales Contractors  
[From:  Ref. 18 p.  1] 
note:  Rankings are based on prime contracts of $25,000 or more for military R&D, 
services and products sold to non-U.S. governments. 
FMS contracts generated over $6 billion in revenue for U.S. contractors in 
1999.  In contrast, the JDIB has essentially no market for FMS because of the restrictions 
placed upon it by the "Three Principles".  It is interesting to note however, that the DoD 
does provide revenue to Japanese contractors.   
In FY 2001, (DoD) awarded $117,979,880 in prime contract actions 
performed in Japan......Among the largest dollar values with particular 
contractors, $33,808,916 was with Sumitomo Heavy Industries and Japan 
Air Manufacturing, $14,055, 203. [Ref. 10 p.  1].   
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While the JDIB does not benefit from a $6 billion FMS market, it does 
benefit from some "foreign contracting" with DoD.  This exception is an example of the 
comparative advantage that DoD has in the Japanese defense market. 
The JDIB operates in an essentially non-competitive environment and 
enjoys none of the benefits of a strong FMS market.  The USDIB operates in a highly-
competitive environment with a robust FMS market.  This environment might indicate 
that the market structure of these two industries is entirely different.  However, a closer 
examination reveals a number of similarities in market structure between the two 
industries. 
2. Market Structure 
As noted above, 95% of JDA's acquisition budget is accounted for by 12 Japanese 
firms, while 15 companies in the USDIB account for 44% of all DoD contracts.  In terms 
of overall market structure, the prime defense market in both countries is concentrated in 
a relatively small number of firms at the top of the industry.  Table 4 (see next page) 
provides a side-by-side comparison of the top ten firms in each industry for FY 2000. 
 Table 4 highlights three market structure similarities between the USDIB and the 
JDIB.  These three similarities are: 
 -A relatively small number of companies dominate the majority of defense 
awards.  Large prime contracts are dominated by only two or three firms.  Table 4 
illustrates that 53% of the total awards went to the top two firms in each industrial base. 
 -The top defense companies are usually comprised of manufacturers of aircraft 
and missiles.  In Table 4 the top three U.S. manufacturers are primary producers of either 
aircraft or missiles and top three Japanese producers include its only maker of fighter 
aircraft and its prime producer of rotary wing aircraft. 
-Although there is some market exit and entry at this level, the same companies 
can generally be found within the top 10-15 firms from year to year. (for example, 
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Table 4. Side-by-Side Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Defense Firms for 
FY2000  
[From:  Ref. 38 p.  1 and Ref. 1 p.  1] 
 The data listed in Table 4 does not imply that the companies therein are the only 
firms that comprise a defense industrial base for each country.  Indeed, there are 
thousands of smaller prime contractors and subcontractors that regularly contribute to the 
defense output of each nation.  Legislative bodies in both countries favor domestic 
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production of defense items in a number of regions throughout the country in order to 
"share the wealth" of government expenditures on defense contracts.  However, the top 
defense firms provide the prime direction for the market and the fates of smaller 
contractors are often tied to the performance of these top firms.  This assertion is 
supported in both the U.S. and Japan as evidenced by the decade-long consolidation of 
the defense industries. 
 The U.S. and Japanese defense industries have a similar market structure.  The 
structure of the two defense industries are driven in large part by the defense polices of 
their governments and the rules governing the sale of defense equipment.  The next 
section will examine key governmental issues that impact both the USDIB and JDIB.  
3. Key Governmental Issues 
a. U.S. Government Issues 
As noted previously, DoD was preoccupied (during the 1990s) with 
alternately favoring and discouraging defense industry consolidation.  The current 
defense focus (and Executive Branch interest) has shifted away from the 1990s issue of 
maintaining a force on limited dollars to reconstituting a force for the global war on 
terror.  While the terrorist attacks on the U. S. of September 11th have resulted in an 
increased defense budget, it remains to be seen if the increase will result in additional 
monies for either Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), or 
Procurement and thus provide more revenue to firms in the USDIB.  The full impact of 
these additional defense expenditures may take several years to have significant impact 
(if at all).  A more immediate concern of the U.S. Government and the USDIB are issues 
that center around export control policies and the loss of intellectual property as a result 
of technology transfer. 
Export controls by the U.S. Government tend to limit, or at the very least 
complicate, the sale of defense items to Japan.  Export controls do serve a positive 
purpose in that they provide protection against loss of technology to unauthorized users.   
(However,) business favors looser regulations to enable more extensive 
cooperative programs with other countries.  It is likely that this issue will 
receive continued attention... [Ref. 8 p. 7].   
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Export controls are outlined in the Export Administration Act of 1979.   In 
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, the Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce for Export Administration (James Jochum) stated:   
For the most part, over the past 23 years U.S. export controls have been 
authorized under the Export Administration Act of 1979.  The 1979 Act 
has expired on six occasions during that time frame; it most recently 
expired in August of last year.  It has not been re-authorized to date. [Ref. 
26 p.  1].   
Jochum goes on to testify that the 1979 Act is outdated and must be 
revised:   
The 1979 Act is a Cold War statute that does not reflect current economic 
and political realities.  The basic national security control authority of this 
law is predicated on the existence of a multilateral regime - the 
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls - that ended 
eight years ago. [Ibid p.  2].   
Export Controls are a complicated issue that impact defense trade by the 
U.S. with Japan.  However, the U.S. Government is sometimes reluctant to even engage 
in "allowable" trade with Japan due to issues concerning intellectual property and transfer 
of technology. 
The Report of the 12th Annual U.S. - Japan Technology Forum notes that 
the "(l)oss of intellectual properties through technology transfer manifests itself in both 
countries in two ways: (1) the unauthorized leakage of technology to third parties, and (2) 
the potential policy implications of authorized third party transfers." [Ref. 8 p.  7]. 
 The report goes on to detail the challenge that results as a part of the technology 
transfer issue.  "At the government-to-government level, general agreements are being 
sought to protect against loss of intellectual properties in the case of third party 
technology transfers, but participants noted that these are difficult since each transaction 
usually has several unique factors." [Ibid p.  7].  While the U.S. Government and U.S. 
firms seem willing to conduct cooperative development and the associated technology 




 Export Controls and protection of intellectual property are two governmental 
issues that, if adequately resolved, could enhance interaction between the USDIB and the 
JDIB.  In comparison, the JDIB has similar governmental issues to consider. 
b. Japanese Government Issues 
The Japanese government is also concerned with the issues of export 
controls and technology transfer primarily as they relate to the restrictions imposed on its 
defense industry by the "Three Principles."  Many in the Japanese government and the 
Japanese defense industry see the "Three Principles" as an inhibitor of defense trade, but 
not an insurmountable roadblock.   
Re-evaluation of the "Three Principles" is seen as necessary by many in 
Japanese industry, but eliminating them altogether is not necessarily 
viewed as being in the country's best interests.  There is growing sentiment 
in the United States that expanded cooperation can be achieved by 
retaining but reinterpreting the Three Principles selectively, in accordance 
with Japanese political sensibilities. [Ibid p.  8].   
In essence, the Japanese defense industry’s ability to engage in "equitable" 
technology transfer is restrained by the Three Principles, but the restraints might be 
relaxed for the U.S., given the proper incentives. 
The second key governmental issue that affects the JDIB is also similar to 
the current U.S environment.  This issue is quite simply, money.  The Report of the 
Twelfth Annual U.S.- Japan Technology Forum framed this issue very succinctly: 
Japan's "traditional" defense industry remains constrained by barely 
increasing procurement budgets and broader controversies surrounding the 
new Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP).  Research and development 
budgets in the new plan imply much more substantial and long-term 
commitments in the future, particularly as regarding missile defense 
systems.  There are doubts about whether these programs will be able to 
move forward given these political disagreements regarding funding 
uncertainty in the future. [Ibid p.  3].     
The JDIB faces a fiscally constrained environment that is likely to 
continue in the short run.  This environment further demonstrates that the JDIB is 
incentivized to interact with the USDIB.  The JDIB needs to expand its market base in 
order to survive and must do so in the face of government restriction.  The JDIB must 
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explore areas that hold growth potential.  A potential area for defense industry expansion 
is entry into markets that have dual-use (i.e. commercial and military use) applications.  
The next section begins with an examination of potential dual-use markets for the JDIB. 
 4. Growth Potential 
a. JDIB Growth Potential 
The growth potential of the JDIB is constrained by both limited fiscal 
resources and the trade restraints imposed by the three principles.  However, both 
Japanese industry and the Japanese military have made substantial advancements in two 
dual-use areas.  These two areas are Information Technology (IT) and mobile computing. 
Information Technology has already transformed the commercial world.  
Presumably IT impact in the in the military area will be just as profound.  
Information security countermeasures have received considerable attention 
within the industry and the Defense Agency and may be an area in which 
JDA may lead DoD.  Private sector leadership in Japanese initiatives is 
evident. [Ibid p.  11].   
The JDA has made a $190 million investment to provide an integrated 
computer system for the Self-Defense Forces and a further $38 million is committed to 
development of an IT system that provides for a common operating environment.  Mobile 
computing (e.g. wireless networks) has the "potential for cooperative programs and 
distinct implications for interoperability in the future." [Ibid p.  11].   
Mobile Computing and IT systems have high dual-use potential, but many 
industry and government leaders do not see shared military application without problems.  
"Both areas could run into national security concerns in the process of pursuing both 
commercial and defense markets." [Ibid p. 11].  DoD and JDA might overcome these 
security concerns with the proper incentives for both the U.S. and Japan and a demand 
for advanced technologies .  If these concerns are properly addressed, the JDIB has 
tremendous growth potential in the IT market and related interoperability development 
with the U.S.   However, the JDIB lags behind in a number of defense systems and this 
represents growth potential for the USDIB. 
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b. USDIB Growth Potential 
The USDIB has growth potential in the U.S. domestic market provided the 
increase in defense budgets continues and is translated into increases in procurement and 
other industrial base-related activities.  There is also growth potential for the USDIB in 
the E.U.  However, defense markets in the E.U. are increasingly problematic, as E.U. 
defense firms face declining defense budgets and over capacity.  In contrast, there are a 
number of areas of expansion for the USDIB in the Japanese market. 
In comparison to other global defense industries (e.g. the E.U.) the USDIB 
has a comparative advantage in the Japanese defense market.   
U.S. defense companies, systems, and equipment have excellent 
reputations in Japan.  The Japanese defense industry sees itself as five to 
ten years behind the United States in systems integration...[Ref. 41 p.  2].   
The areas in which the USDIB might expand its market include: missile 
technology, air defense systems, target acquisition systems, defense electronics avionics, 
semiconductor components, logistics software, and simulation-related hardware and 
software.  The USDIB can expand into the dual-use markets as well.  According to a 
1999 report prepared by the Department of Commerce, opportunities exist for U.S. 
defense firms in the following dual-use markets: telecommunications equipment, 
medical/diagnostic equipment, aircraft and parts, security and safety equipment, and 
environmental and pollution control equipment. [Ibid pp. 4-5].  The Japanese defense 
market has growth potential for the USDIB in both "traditional" defense products and 
dual-use technologies.   
Inhibitors to USDIB growth into this market are the limited Japanese 
defense budget and the Japanese adherence to "kokusanka" in some defense sectors (e.g. 
aerospace).  These inhibitors may diminish in importance should Japan seek to grow its 
defense industrial base and realize economies in defense production through strategic 
partnerships with U.S. firms. 
The USDIB exists in a highly-competitive environment while the JDIB 
exists in a practically non-competitive environment.  The USDIB and JDIB have similar 
market structures with large defense firms (particularly aerospace/missile firms) 
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obtaining the lion's share of defense dollars in a given year.  The USDIB and JDIB face 
similar governmental issues concerning export policies and concerns about technology 
transfer.  Both Industrial Bases share concerns over the continued level of defense 
funding, with the JDIB facing the more meager potential revenue stream.  Growth 
potential exists for both the USDIB and the JDIB.  This growth potential is inhibited by:  
the need to address security concerns over IT issues, the limited Japanese defense budget, 
and the Japanese practice of limiting some sectors of defense production to domestic 
contractors to maintain autarky.  The emphasis on domestic defense production is heavily 
influenced by the strategic direction of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF).  The 
next section will analyze the impact of the future direction of the JSDF on the JDIB. 
 
F. FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE JSDF AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
JDIB 
The JDIB has been analyzed, thus far, in reference to its political environment; 
and in comparison to the USDIB.  Next, an examination of the future direction of the 
JSDF is undertaken in order to assess the impact of the JSDF's direction on the JDIB.  
The two primary issues that impact the future direction of the JSDF are the recently 
updated Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP) and the emergent role of the Japanese military 
in international security.  This section begins with an examination of the impact of the 
MTDP. 
1. Impact of the MTDP 
The MTDP is the primary document that governs the acquisition of new systems 
for the JSDF.  The MTDP is a five-year plan and was updated in 2000 to reflect planned 
actions for the period 2001-2005.  On 15 December 2000, the Japanese government 
approved a $203 billion five-year procurement plan "for modernizing the Self-Defense 
forces and dealing more effectively with asymmetric threats in the Asia-Pacific region." 
[Ref. 8 p.  3].  Table 5 (see pp. 28-29) lists the major programs of the MTDP: 
One of the recent additions to the JSDF modernization plan is the effort to 
modernize and integrate its IT infrastructure.  "Major improvements are foreseen in 
integrating self-defense forces information technology systems, improving the capability 
to respond to asymmetric threats (such as information warfare, nuclear biological or 
 28
 
chemical attacks), and improved disaster relief." [Ibid p. 3].  The JDA views this IT effort 
as an enabling component for the JSDF.  Section 2.1 of the MTDP entitled "Basic 
Polices" states that:  "In response to the revolutionary advancement of information 
technology, efforts will be made to establish an advanced network environment 
throughout the Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces (SDF), to enhance intelligence 
as well as command and communication functions and to ensure information security." 
[Ref. 42 p.  1].  The JDA seems intent on creating an IT infrastructure for its SDF that is 
both modern and capable of interoperation with U.S forces.  This high-priority effort 
should translate into procurement and R&D contracts for members of the JDIB.  
Major Programs, Mid-Term Defense Plan, JFY 2001-05 
Area System/Program Units/Five Year 
Costs* 
Type 90 MBT 
(Main Battle Tank) 
91 Units; $555 
MLRS 
(Multiple Launch Rocket System) 
18 Units; 303 
Armored Vehicle 129 Units; 152 
Transport Helicopter 
CH-47JA 
7 Units; 228 




New medium range SAM 1.25 Groups; 608 
Destroyer 5; 4,104 
Guided Missile Destroyer DDG with latest 
Aegis system 
2 units; 608 
Helicopter Destroyer DDH 2; 1,520 
Submarines 5; 1,976 




Airborne mine countermeasures helicopter  
MH-53E 
2 units; 76 
F-15 Modernization 12 units; 228 Air defense 
capabilities F-2 Support Fighter 47 units; 3,724 
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Transport helicopter CH-47J 12 units; 380 
Tanker transport 4 units; 684 
 
BADGE system modernization N/A; 190 
Defense information infrastructure (tri-service 
computer integration program) 
N/A; 190 IT network 
Common operating environment N/A; 38 
Fixed-wing maritime patrol/ASW P-3C and  
C-1 transport replacements 
N/A; 2,584 
New main battle tank N/A; 380 
Research and 
development 
Theater missile defense N/A; 28  
(JFY 2001 only) 
Table 5. Major Programs, MTDP Japanese Fiscal Year 2001-2005 
[From:  Ref. 8 p.  4] 
*Values converted to millions of FY$2002  
DoD program managers will observe that the potential exists for cooperative 
efforts between the U.S., the JDIB, and the JSDF in both IT and other programs listed in  
Table 5.  As noted in the report of the 12th U.S. - Japan Technology Forum: "Some 
programs offer considerable potential for cooperative efforts between the United States 
and Japan, specifically NTW (Navy Theater Wide Missile Defense) systems and P-3 
replacements." [Ref. 8 p.  4].   
The degree to which Japan is willing to cooperate with DoD and the USDIB on 
these programs is not certain.  Although Table 5 provides a number of potential venues 
for co-development and bilateral acquisition projects: "Japanese government officials are 
quick to assert that no decisions have been made regarding potential cooperative projects 
(and)...cooperative projects are not necessarily viewed as a net increase in 
opportunities..." [Ibid p.  4].  Both the Japanese defense industry and the Japanese 
government remain concerned that projects that promote U.S. - Japan interoperability 
could result in a loss of either technology or revenue for the JDIB.  This concern over 
loss of revenue and/or intellectual property has the potential to hurt the JSDF in that the 
JSDF may either lose access to the most advanced (U.S.) technologies or Japanese 
procurement timelines are extended in order to give Japanese manufacturers time to 
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develop comparable technologies.  However, the primary impediment to the JDA's push 
for modernization is money.   
 While significant support exists for expenditures on modernization of the JSDF 
(as reflected in the MTDP), some in Japanese government wonder: "whether funding 
levels for specific programs are realistic given the likelihood of rising costs, inflation, and 
possible program delays." [Ibid p.  3].  The JDA notes that: "Defense-related 
expenditures for (J)FY2001 total 4.9388 trillion yen (about $36.9 billion) , a 17.1 billion 
yen (about $127 million) increase over the previous fiscal year (excluding costs for the 
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)), but the real growth taking into account 
price increases and other factors is zero, indicating that defense-related expenditures are 
still moderate." [Ref. 42 p.  3].  Zero growth of the defense budget, and concerns over 
inflation, rising costs, and program delays; indicate that the MTDP may be more wishful 
thinking than program policy.  DoD and the USDIB could partner with Japanese defense 
firms to mitigate some of the current economic concerns.  Monetary concerns appear to 
dominate JSDF and JDIB interaction, however, the JSDF is in the midst of an expansion 
of its role that could necessitate spending at higher levels. 
2. Emergent Role of the JSDF in International Security 
The JSDF has received unprecedented support from the Japanese Diet to expand 
its international role in the wake of the September 11th attacks on the U.S.  One of the 
most significant changes is that the JSDF was recently "authorized to provide support, 
not only for U.S. forces but also for the forces of other nations participating in the anti-
terrorism campaign." [Ref. 42 p.  3].  This authorization marks a departure from the 
Japanese post-World War II commitment to only engage militarily in direct defense of 
the Japanese homeland.  This JSDF support was manifested in the dispatch of six 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels in support of the antiterrorism 
campaign.  "This was the first "wartime" operation outside Japan by the JSDF since its 
inception in 1954." [Ibid p.  4].  It seems likely that if Japan continues this expanded 
international role for the JSDF that it must not only modernize, but also increase the size 
and lethality of its defense forces.  The JDIB will undoubtedly benefit from any 
expansion of the defense forces.  The JSDF is also considering enhancing its capability as 
an autonomous force in the region. 
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During June 2001, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Maikiko Tanaka "told German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer that Tokyo's military alliance with the United States is 
an "easy way" for Japan to enjoy security.  But now, she said, "It is necessary for Japan to 
become more independent in light of its economic power." [Ref. 2 p.  2].  Japan seems to 
indicate that it is ready to expand its role as a regional power.  This intention is strongly 
supported by the U.S.   
Washington is playing an important role in pushing Japan toward its new 
role.  The Bush administration views Japan as the linchpin to Asian 
security.  If Japan will do more of the heavy lifting of containing an 
expansionist China, Washington can lower its own profile, the costs of 
deployments and the exposure of its forces to attack. [Ibid p. 3].   
Support among the Japanese leadership and in Washington indicates that the JDIB 
might enjoy the benefits of a military buildup over the next decade.  However, any 
increase in defense forces still faces stiff internal opposition. 
Article IX of Japan's 1947 constitution limits it to a force that has "the smallest 
necessary defense capability to protect its sovereignty." [Ref. 11 p.  1].  Article IX is 
further interpreted to imply that Japan may not engage in collective defense when an ally 
is threatened and some Japanese lawmakers fear that a change to this policy might 
involve Japan's military in a manner that violates the Japanese constitution.  This fear was 
voiced during the debate over the deployment of JMSDF vessels described in the 
preceding paragraph.  Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi stated the Japanese support of 
the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign:  
(I)s within the framework of the present Constitution, but just barely.  
Anything beyond this, and we will have not choice but to deal with it by 
revising the constitution. [Ibid p.  4].   
It seems that the Japanese government may be primed for a serious debate 
concerning revision of the constitution (and the "Three Principles"?) and subsequently 
expand the size and composition of the JSDF.  Such an action would benefit the JDIB 
and could potentially benefit the USDIB, if DoD and the USDIB are positioned to 
capitalize on an expansion of the JSDF. 
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The future of the JDIB is linked to the uncertain future of the JSDF.  While a 
number of forces exist that favor expansion and modernization of the JDIB (e.g. MTDP 
modernization effort and the expanded role of the JMSDF), it is unclear whether these 
forces will result in higher defense budgets and more defense contracts for the JDIB.  It is 
evident that the U.S. favors an expanded role for the JSDF in both regional and 
international military roles and the JDIB (and USDIB) may directly benefit from the U.S. 
push for a stronger Japanese military. 
G. SUMMARY 
The end of the cold war marked a transition point for the JDIB and 1991 saw the 
last substantial hike in defense spending.  The JDIB has survived despite restrictions on 
arms exports known as the "Three Principles".  The JDIB has survived primarily through 
a Japanese policy of "kokusanka" which favors internal production of defense items even 
when production of those items results in products that are of lower quality and more 
costly than comparable. U.S. products. When domestic production is not possible, the 
JDIB (and Japanese government) has engaged the U.S. in cooperative development 
programs and JDIB firms produce a number of U.S. defense items under licensed 
production and co-production agreements.   
The JDIB is a small industry and about 12 firms account for most of Japanese 
defense contracts in a given year.  The JDIB is essentially a non-competitive market that 
exists in an era of fiscal austerity and zero growth.  In contrast, the USDIB is a highly-
competitive market and has recently seen an increase in defense-related expenditures. 
Despite these contrasts, the JDIB and USDIB share a number of similarities.  The USDIB 
is similar to the JDIB in that:  (a) it is also dominated by several large companies at the 
top of the defense industry; (b) the USDIB and JDIB share concerns over export controls 
and protection of intellectual property rights and; (c) growth potential exists in both 
markets, particularly in dual-use technologies.    
The JDIB is almost wholly dependent on the JSDF for its defense revenues.  The 
JSDF faces an uncertain future and this uncertainty weighs heavily on the future of the 
JDIB.  The MTDP and emerging international roles for the JSDF indicate the possibility 
of positive growth for the industry; however, these forces are counterbalanced by 
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domestic economic uncertainty and a fear that Japan may become unnecessarily 
entangled in international military actions.   
The ability of the JSDF and JDIB to effectively address emerging defense issues 
will almost certainly depend on effective interaction with DoD and the USDIB.  
Emerging defense issues are likely to include U.S. - Japan interaction in the area of 
defense acquisition.  The U.S. - Japan acquisition environment is defined by past and on-
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE US-JAPAN ACQUISITION 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To effectively identify future acquisition opportunities for DoD, it is necessary to 
define the current U.S-Japan acquisition environment.  The current U.S. - Japan 
acquisition environment can be defined through an examination of selected U.S. - Japan 
acquisition interfaces.  In this chapter, the U.S. - Japan acquisition environment is defined 
through an analysis of three U.S. - Japan acquisition interfaces.  These three interfaces 
are:  cooperative development of the Mitsubishi FS-X (F-2) Support Fighter, Foreign 
Military Sales co-production of the Aegis Anti-Air Warfare radar system, and 
cooperative development of a Theater Missile Defense system.   
The three interfaces are presented as modified case studies that focus on economic 
the factors present in each interface.  These modified case studies provide the basis for 
identification and evaluation of economic factors present in the U.S. - Japan acquisition 
environment.  This analysis of the U.S. - Japan acquisition environment begins with an 
analysis of the most expensive and controversial U.S. - Japan acquisition project to date, 
the Mitsubishi F-2 Support Fighter.  
B. FS-X (F-2)  
1. Background 
In the early 1980s, the JDA began to develop a replacement for its F-1 ground 
attack aircraft.  DoD was initially interested in providing a U.S. aircraft as a replacement 
for the Japanese F-1.  JDA resisted attempts by DoD to proffer a U.S.-designed aircraft as 
a replacement.  The JDA viewed indigenous development of a replacement aircraft as 
beneficial in two areas:  (1) autonomy in the Japanese acquisition process and (2) 
development of the Japanese aerospace industry.  The JDA assessment was that Japan 
would receive a greater marginal benefit from autonomous development that it would 
otherwise receive from co-development with the U.S. 
During the summer of 1985, DoD began a concentrated effort to convince Japan 
of the need for co-development of the FS-X.  The incentive for DoD to push for co-
 36
 
development was Congressional concern over the growing trade deficit with Japan.  The 
FS-X program was seen as a vehicle to facilitate the export of U.S. aerospace products.  
In 1988, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was concluded between the U.S. and 
Japan.  The MOU called for Japan to undertake cooperative development of the new 
Japanese fighter with the U.S.  The FS-X was to be based upon the existing U.S. F-16 
airframe. 
The MOU was submitted to Congress in 1989 for approval.  Congress favored the 
sale of F-16 technology to the extent that it provided for more production of F-16 
components in the U.S.  However, Congressional critics of the MOU were concerned 
that, in terms of technology transfer, the FS-X project "represented a giveaway of 
advanced aerospace technology to America's most relentless economic rival, with few 
guarantees of anything significant in return" [Ref. 28 p.  2].  The concern over technology 
transfer issues resulted in a significant amendment to the original MOU that caused both 
anger and frustration in Japan. 
The revised MOU asserted that the U.S. would provide a disproportionate amount 
of aerospace technology in the co-development process.  Based upon this assertion, the 
new MOU designated most FS-X technologies as derivatives of existing F-16 technology.  
Therefore, Japanese defense firms would be required to automatically provide any 
Japanese developments to the U.S. at no cost.  This process was labeled as "flowback" of 
technology and was strongly resented in Japan.  The resentment in Japan was founded 
upon two key issues:  (1) Japan had essentially been "bullied" into a co-development 
agreement and (2) once the agreement was signed, the U.S. amended the agreement to 
make Japan a minor player in its own development program.  Despite Japanese 
resentment, the project moved forward and the first co-developed and co-produced 
aircraft was delivered to the JASDF in 2000.  A timeline of major FS-X events for 1985-
2000 is provided at Table 6 (see next page). 
Lockheed Martin was awarded the joint production contract for the F-2 in 1996.  
Lockheed has been pleased with its partnership with MHI.  Lockheed's F-2 Program 
Director, Don Jones, stated:  "Lockheed Martin has had an outstanding relationship with 
MHI and with the JDA during the development phase of the F-2 and we look forward to 
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continuing that relationship as we enter into production." [Ref. 40 p. 3].  The two firms 
have also engaged in mutually beneficial technology transfer.  One of the most notable 
achievements was the transfer of unique cocuring methods developed by Japanese 
industry and used by Lockheed in the production of wing components for the F-2 [Ibid p.  
3].   The F-2 is currently in production despite the difficulties it encountered during the 
development process.   However, most of the difficulties in program production were due 
to problems caused by the U.S. Government (vice industry). 
Year Event 
1985 Japan tentatively approves national fighter program 
1986 U. S. Proposes Joint modification of U.S. fighter 
1987 Japan accepts joint modification of F-16C 
1988 Research and Development MOU signed 
1989 License and Technology Agreement signed  
Side letters added from both U.S. and Japan 
Implementing Arrangement drafted 
1990 Research and Development begins 
Memorandum of Implementation and Agreement signed 
1992 Technology Transfer Procedures Annex added to base agreement 
Oct 
1995 
First Flight of production prototype F-2 
1996 130 F-2s approved for procurement/production by Japanese government 
Sep 
1996 
Lockheed Martin awarded joint production contract with MHI 
Oct 
2000 
MHI delivers first F-2 to JASDF 
Table 6. FS-X/F-2 Events Timeline  
[From:  Ref. 30 p.  4] 
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2. Analysis of the FS-X Program 
In Dr. Mark Lorell's book on the FS-X, he identifies five problem areas in the  
FS-X development project: 
1.  The U.S. Government did not formulate and implement a single 
coordinated strategy with Japan that harmonized both U.S. military and 
economic objectives. 
2.  The American side pressured the Japanese political leadership to accept 
a type of cooperative development program that was strongly opposed by 
the Japanese military R&D establishment. 
3.  The FS-X program should have been structured to provide greater U.S. 
influence over the final design configuration and technological evolution 
of the aircraft. 
4.  The U.S. Government underestimated Japan's military R&D 
capabilities. 
5.  U.S. policy on technology transfer and access was fundamentally 
flawed. [Ref.  43 pp.  5-6]. 
The researcher selected three of Lorell's problems for further analysis in the 
context of economic opportunities for DoD.  The first problem to analyze is the 
disharmony of U.S. military and economic objectives in the FS-X program. 
a. The Absence of a Single U.S. Strategy for the FS-X 
The U.S. military's objective for the FS-X program was relatively simple; 
DoD wanted to prevent Japan from developing a completely indigenous advanced fighter 
aircraft.  Congress, on the other hand, was very concerned that any co-development 
project with Japan would result in a disproportionate transfer of aerospace technology to 
Japan.  Lorell notes that: "(I)t is a great irony that DoD's apparent success in achieving its 
most important objective - stopping indigenous development by winning Japanese 
acceptance of an FS-X based on the F-16/Agile Falcon design - ultimately served to 
provoke the explosion of criticism from Congress against the FS-X agreement" [Ref. 30 
p.  207].  Congress viewed the FS-X agreement as nothing more than a poor decision to 
give advanced aerospace technology to the U.S.' chief economic competitor.  DoD 
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wanted to allow Japan access to the technology to prevent them from developing a new 
military capability; Congress feared that giving Japan access to technology would give 
them an economic advantage in future aerospace development.  Two U.S. entities created 
conflicting objectives in the same program.   
In contrast, Japanese Government and industry leaders united behind a 
single goal - development of an indigenous Japanese fighter.  Japanese Government and 
industry leaders knew (early on) that the U.S. could exert enough political pressure to 
force Japan into a co-development agreement.  Japanese negotiators decided to accept co-
development (based on an F-16 airframe) and then negotiate "a program structure that 
provided latitude to transform the collaborative FS-X as much as possible into (an) 
indigenous Japanese fighter." [Ref. 28 p.  2].  The Japanese recognized that fusion of 
military, national, and economic objectives in this program was essential to attainment of 
the desired goal. 
The FS-X program indicates that DoD Program Managers should work 
with interested parties (in both industry and government) to identify and evaluate the 
economic issues present in any project that involves international collaboration.  These 
economic issues must be incorporated into program goals and should represent a careful 
integration of strategic security concerns, acquisition objectives (e.g. minimize cost, 
minimize schedule risk, and maximize performance), and international defense industry 
synergies.   In the FS-X case, integration of DoD and Congressional objectives might 
have resulted in a more mutually beneficial program in terms of both technology 
development and overall economic benefit. 
b. Underestimating Japanese R&D Capabilities 
Japan views its aerospace industry as an integral player in its overall 
industrial and technological base.  Japanese industry and government view investment in 
aerospace R&D as a multi-faceted activity that is value-added to a wide range of military 
and commercial applications.  Firms in the JDIB view spin-off (military to commercial 
applications) and spin-on (commercial to military applications) technologies as ends in 
themselves.  Japanese industry leaders created a metaphor for aerospace as a strategic 
industry.  The metaphor was a tree with "the industry as the trunk of a tree with roots in 
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the key basic technologies and fruits in every variety of industrial and consumer product 
line.3" [Ref. 44 p. 245].  In the FS-X project, the U.S. failed to recognize that Japan 
viewed their R&D investment as broadly applicable to both military and commercial 
sectors and not just applicable to development of an indigenous fighter.  This failure to 
adequately appreciate Japanese dedication to aerospace R&D caused the U.S. to severely 
underestimate their R&D capabilities. 
The U.S. also felt that Japan had nothing to offer in military aerospace 
R&D.  Lorell notes that:  
With respect to military R&D, most American experts in government and 
industry believed Japan had little to offer the United States.  When a DoD 
technical team visiting Japan in 1984 discovered that the Japanese were 
developing a radically new type of fire-control radar for (the FS-X), the 
information apparently languished at the Pentagon until much later, when 
technology access became a hot political issue during the height of the FS-
X controversy in Congress. [Ref. 30 p. 10].  
The Pentagon virtually ignored the potential value of any Japanese 
military aerospace R&D efforts and unwittingly contributed to Congress' view that the 
FS-X project was simply transferring valuable U.S. aerospace technology to Japan.  Had 
DoD more readily recognized that valuable Japanese technology was in development, it 
might have more effectively made its case in Congress for co-development. 
The economic lesson for DoD Program Managers is that Japan has a 
credible R&D program for military applications and it treats its R&D capability as a 
priority.  Japan is viable source for collaborative R&D in a number of defense-related 
areas.  The opportunity for collaborative R&D is particularly valuable in the current 
environment of fiscally-constrained defense budgets.  Table 7 (see next page) provides an 
overview of JDA expenditures on R&D for the period 1991-2002. 
Table 7 (see next page) indicates that: (1) Japan's R&D expenditures are 
relatively small and (2) Japan will try to increase R&D expenditures despite an economic 
downturn and virtually zero-growth defense budgets.   These two factors create an 
environment where DoD might leverage Japanese dedication to R&D to assist in 
                                                 
3   A graphical representation of this tree is provided at Appendix D.  
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development of advanced defense technologies.  This type of cooperation is not limited to 
government-to-government interaction.  MHI and Boeing Corporation have jointly 
developed a new rocket engine for commercial application.  The two companies invested 
over $10 million to develop the engine and the project was 100 percent commercially-
funded. [Ref. 3 p. 1 and Ref 4 p. 1].  Government-to-government and/or industry-to-
industry collaboration with Japan in R&D might help to mitigate program risks and 







at Y120=$1 R&D 
Budget Ratios 
Procurement        R&D 
1991 36.55 10.14 .86 27.7 2.3 
1992 37.93 9.52 .96 25.1 2.5 
1993 38.67 8.99 1.03 23.3 2.7 
1994 39.03 8.32 1.05 21.3 2.7 
1995 39.36 7.25 1.16 18.4 3.0 
1996 40.38 7.63 1.25 18.9 3.1 
1997* 41.18 7.79 1.34 18.9 3.2 
1998* 41.08 7.87 1.06 19.2 2.6 
1999* 41.00 8.02 1.09 19.5 2.6 
2000* 41.02 7.78 1.12 19.0 2.7 
2001* 41.16 7.86 1.19 19.0 3.0 
2002* 41.16 7.80 1.30 19.0 3.0 
Table 7. JDA Procurement and R&D Expenditures 1991-2002  
[From:  Ref. 34 p.  1] 
*Does not include additional expenditures for special Okinawa base measures 
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c. U.S. Policy on Technology Transfer 
The fundamental flaw in U.S. policy on technology transfer in the FS-X 
program was the U.S.' unfounded concern that the transfer of the F-16 Technical Data 
Package (TDP) would result in selling "Japan the blueprints for making one of the 
world's best tactical fighters for a mere $60 million." [Ref. 30 p. 359].  The concern that 
the U.S. was giving away critical aerospace technology resulted in friction throughout the 
program.  As a result of this friction, and unprecedented scrutiny of each transfer event, 
the TDP was delivered behind schedule and in a piecemeal manner.  
This situation clearly displeased the Japanese...To many Japanese, access 
to U.S. technology appeared to be increasingly restricted and 
circumscribed.  Furthermore, Japan had to pay for everything it got (and 
had to provide "flowback" of derived technologies at no cost).  And to add 
insult to injury, the Americans were taking nearly a year to transfer the 
data package, the exact content of which would not be known by the 
Japanese until the end of the procedure (thus stalling the start of the 
Japanese R&D effort).  [Ibid p. 271].    
The U.S. policy on technology transfer essentially hobbled a program that 
the Japanese had wanted to conduct indigenously and U.S. demands for free flowback 
further eroded any potential Japanese proprietary technological gains (one of the main 
reasons Japan had wanted to develop the FS-X indigenously). 
U.S. concerns over technology transfer were overblown.  A 1992 GAO 
report found that, not only had control of technology transfer been adequate, it may have 
been "too strict" [Ibid p. 361].  The end result of this policy was to obviate the U.S.' 
primary goal in the co-development program.  "It seems certain that the U.S. denial of 
rights for licensed production of certain components and technologies in Japan during the 
FS-X R&D phase has encouraged even greater indigenous development by Japanese 
industry" [Ibid p. 361].  The technology transfer issue contributed to undermining the 
U.S. goals for the program, and this issue was clearly avoidable.   
A key issue in technology transfer is how to value technology and 
intellectual property.  Technology could be treated as a marketable good if it were given a 
value that is determined by its marginal benefit to each side.  When the transfer of 
technology is involved in an international collaboration, the cost of allowing access to the 
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technology must be included in the program cost.  In the FS-X case, the agreed-upon cost 
of the F-16 TDP should have reflected both the cost of access to the technology and the 
(U.S.) benefit of preventing development of an indigenous Japanese fighter.   Congress 
did not identify direct parity in FS-X technology transfer and therefore saw no real 
marginal benefit to the U.S.  However, the real marginal benefit of the technology 
transfer was prevention of indigenous fighter development by Japan.   
In sharing technology and intellectual property, the U.S. must also 
consider how sharing its technology will contribute to security alliances and 
commonality/interoperability of systems.  While there may be a rationale for retaining the 
rights to certain technologies, this retention of knowledge must be weighed against the 
cost to the combined R&D effort.  The FS-X case seems to indicate that flowback 
technologies were perceived as having some marginal benefit to the U.S.  In future 
acquisition projects, a requirement to provide flowback of technology at no cost to the 
receiving country could create an asymmetry in the technology transfer market and 
disincentivize program participation.  The economic lesson is that a mutually agreed 
upon value must be assigned to transferred technology, otherwise the costs of 
participation in a co-development program, like the FS-X, become so high that any (real 
or perceived) benefits are lost. 
3. Lessons of the FS-X Program  
The FS-X program can be classified as a successful program because, in the end, 
it delivered a high performance aircraft to the JASDF that is a significant improvement 
over the F-1.  However, the road to success was longer and bumpier than necessary.  The 
key lessons from the FS-X are:  Congress and DoD must have unified objectives and 
these objectives must incorporate economic concerns; (2) Japan considers R&D 
important and can have significant technological contributions to a cooperative program 
and; (3) in technologically intense programs, like the FS-X, technology transfer issues 
must be addressed from an economic perspective.  In the next section, the highly 
successful collaboration effort on the Aegis Foreign Military Sales Program is presented 




C. AEGIS FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) CO-PRODUCTION 
PROGRAM  
1. Background 
The Aegis system is a ship-borne combat system that has, as its centerpiece, a 
phased array radar that "can automatically track multiple targets simultaneously while 
maintaining surveillance of the surrounding airspace." [Ref.  48 p. 1].  Although Aegis is 
a complete combat system, Japan purchased only the Anti-Air Warfare system and some 
combat system elements.  The Aegis system itself is actually installed by Japanese 
shipbuilders.  The U.S. Navy's (USN’s) Program Manager, Ship 400 (PMS 400) office 
has overall responsibility for the program and Lockheed-Martin is the prime U.S. 
contractor.  Japanese firms involved in the program include:  MHI, IHI, Hitachi, and 
MELCO.  The first Aegis equipped ship, JDS Kongo, "was commissioned on March 25, 
1993, with all USN-supplied systems operational.  Both JMSDF and the shipyard were 
very pleased" [Ibid p. 4].  In May 2002, DoD began the sale of a fifth Aegis system to 
Japan.  The Aegis system encountered problems similar to the FS-X concerning 
technology transfer, however, these problems were handled quite differently. 
2. Congressional Concerns  
At the inception of the Aegis FMS program in 1988, Congress was concerned the 
Japan might reverse engineer the Aegis system and initiate indigenous production.  As a 
result of Congressional concerns, additional restrictions were placed on the sale that 
discouraged reverse engineering of the system.  Congress also wanted Japan to buy a 
total Aegis ship and not just the AAW system.  This option was strongly favored by the 
U.S. shipbuilding industry.  However the purchase of a complete ship by Japan seemed 
highly unlikely.   
 Several factors weighed in favor of an "Aegis AAW only" deal:  (1) an earlier 
ship-borne AAW system (TARTAR) was previously sold to Japan as a separate system 
(i.e. an established precedent), (2) Japan needed the ship construction contracts for its 
depressed ship-building industry, (3) the Japanese ship would contain a number of 
Japanese-derived systems (because the equivalent U.S. systems were not eligible for 
release under FMS), and it was estimated that: 
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 one Aegis (AAW system) for Japan will result in 5,400 man-years of U.S. 
labor and that U.S.-built Aegis-capable hulls would bring 2,700 more.  
Thus, for every ship-building job we (Congress) insist on, we risk losing 
two jobs in the electronics industry. [Ref. 46 p. 2].   
These four factors combined to make it highly unlikely that Japan would buy a 
complete U.S. ship or that Congress would insist on a complete ship buy.  Congress 
eventually relented and an MOU was approved for the program.  Unlike the FS-X, the 
overall benefit of the sale of the system outweighed concerns over technology transfer.  
However, technology transfer did become an issue later in the Aegis program. 
3. Procedures for Technology Transfer 
Lockheed-Martin opened an office in MHI's Nagasaki shipyard in 1989, shortly 
after problems began to develop over technology transfer and releasability policies.  
Lockheed-Martin, PMS 400, JMSDF, and the Japanese contractors quickly developed 
detailed technology transfer guidelines to address concerns on both sides.  These 
concerns were addressed through implementation of four guidelines:   
(1) All drawings, ship interface criteria and test procedures got through 
formal Navy-to-Navy channels;  (2) a liaison information transfer report 
(LITR) procedure (was) established for Lockheed Martin to directly 
answer MHI's questions on data formally transferred; (3) nonreleasable 
data may not be transferred by LITR; and (4) copies of LITRs are sent to 
PMS 400 a the same time they are sent to Japan.  
[Ref. 19 p. 4]. 
These procedures enabled efficient transfer of technical data.  The key feature of 
this design is that the guidelines were written to allow timely industry-to-industry 
interaction where possible while simultaneously keeping oversight agencies aware of on-
going activity.  These procedures have allowed the Aegis FMS program to proceed 
smoothly and the program has provided benefits to the both the U.S. and Japan. 
4.   Benefits of Aegis 
The Aegis program has accounted for over $2 billion in FMS to the U.S. and 
Japan has shared in the developmental costs of the system.  The overall cost of 
production of the system has been reduced as economies of scale are realized through 
larger production quantities (Japan also pays a fair share of common overhead costs).  
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U.S. Navy officials testified before Congress that the U.S. would benefit from "a 
potential reduction in the number of ships the USN would have to deploy in the Western 
Pacific as Japan increased its capability with Aegis." [Ibid p. 7].  Lockheed-Martin 
benefited from the program through the training of a "large group of U.S. engineers and 
managers in an international environment." [Ibid p. 6].   The JMSDF continues to benefit 
from the program by having an advanced AAW capability on its warships.  Both the U.S. 
and Japan have benefited through greater interoperability and commonality of systems.   
5. Economic Factors in the Aegis Program 
The key economic factors in the Aegis program were the economies of scale 
realized through expanded production and sharing of common overhead costs.  The 
Lockheed-Martin interface with Japanese shipbuilders has also provided a potential 
economic benefit to the USDIB by enabling more proficient participation in international 
programs.  A form of cost-benefit analysis was conducted (by Congress) concerning the 
potential lost revenues from failure to sell the program as a complete ship vice just a 
radar system.  This analysis concluded that the benefits from the sale of just the AAW 
system outweighed the potential for lost revenues due to not selling Japan a complete 
ship.  The Aegis program is an example of a successful collaborative effort between the 
U.S. and Japan.  In the next section, another successful collaborative effort is examined, 
U.S. - Japan cooperation on Theater Missile Defense.      
 D. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 
1. Background 
In the 1980s DoD conducted "a preliminary study of missile defense requirements 
in the Western Pacific." [Ref. 17 p. 1].  A U.S. - Japan Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
working group was created in 1993 "to provide a forum for regular discussion of TMD.... 
On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a Taepodong three-stage missile over the 
Japanese archipelago." [Ibid p. 2].  The 1998 North Korean missile launch provided 
impetus to the missile program, which had languished since the establishment of the 
working group in 1993 and :   
(i)n 1999, the US and Japan signed a three-year MOU on Cooperative 
Ballistic Missile Research.  The focus of this project has been joint 
research on four component technology areas (second stage booster, 
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lightweight nose cone, IR sensor, and kinetic warhead) to be integrated 
into the SM-3 missile4 as part of the Navy Theater Wide Defense System. 
[Ref. 37 p. 1].   
The overall TMD system consists of a complex interface of space-based, sea-
based, and land-based sensors, weapons, command, control, computer, communications, 
and intelligence systems.  The U.S. - Japan TMD research effort is currently focused on 
mid-course intercept of ballistic missiles using sea-based systems (the Aegis radar is one 
component of the sensor system).  Requirements analyses for this stage of the program 
were scheduled for completion in June 20025.  Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are the 
prime U.S. contractors for the system.  MHI is the lead firm in a consortium of Japanese 
defense companies that includes:  MELCO, KHI, Toshiba, Fujitsu, and IHI.  The TMD 
program has brought both benefits and challenges. 
2.  Economic Benefits of TMD  
Through participation in the TMD, Japan benefits from the U.S.' long-term 
commitment to research in missile defense.  Japan's acquisition of the Aegis radar system 
has helped to quickly integrate Japan in the current Sea-based Mid-Course Defense 
initiative.  Japan enjoys the use of certain U.S. test facilities as a result of the program.  
The Japanese have contributed significantly to technological advancement of the project 
by providing advance technologies that contribute weight reduction (e.g. composite 
materials, and miniaturized components) and radar technologies applicable to upper-tier 
(i.e. mid-course) systems.  [Ibid p. 1].   
3. Economic Challenges in TMD 
Economic challenges in the TMD program have centered on differences in 
acquisition and contracting procedures.  The specific challenges have been: 
(a) The Japanese R&D contract is funded for multiple years whereas the U.S. 
contract covers only one year, 
                                                 
4The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) is designed solely for TBM defense and operates above the Earth’s 
atmosphere to intercept medium and long-range tactical ballistic missiles [Ref 37 and Ref 39 p. 4].  The 
SM is the Navy's principle Surface-to-Air Missile and has undergone numerous pre-planned product 
improvements. [Ref. 39].  See also Appendix B. 
5 Results of this analysis were not available prior to publication of this thesis 
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(b) JDA's contract with MHI is a Firm-Fixed Price contract whereas the U.S. 
contractors enjoy the benefit of a Cost-Plus type contract, 
(c) JDA's contract defines detailed requirements for the R&D phase while the 
DoD contract only defines top-level requirements. [Ref. 31 p. 18]. 
These challenges have been overcome primarily due to both countries dedication 
to the project.  However, the Bush administration plans to accelerate deployment of the 
sea-based system.  Given this accelerated schedule it may be difficult for a financially-
strapped JDA to continue as a full partner in development. 
4. Economic Factors in TMD 
A key economic factor in TMD (thus far) has been the economic risk reduction 
that was achieved through sharing the costs of the R&D effort.  The U.S.' FY 2002 
defense budget allocates $3.3 billion to TMD over the next five years.  Japan will spend 
$53.1 million in the R&D effort on TMD in JFY 2002 [Ref. 37 p. 2].  Future economic 
factors that may apply to TMD are:  economies of scale in sensor and missile production, 
spin-off technologies as a result of advanced command and control systems, and 
additional interoperability benefits thorough increased reliance on common 
communication systems. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter characterized the U.S. - Japan acquisition environment through 
identification of key economic factors present in the FS-X/F-2 cooperative development 
program, the Aegis FMS cooperative production program, and the cooperative R&D 
effort in TMD.   Key economic factors that were: 
(1) DoD program managers must identify and evaluate the economic issues 
present in any project that involves international collaboration.  These macroeconomic 
issues must be incorporated into program goals and should represent a careful integration 
of strategic security goals, acquisition objectives (e.g. minimize cost, minimize schedule 
risk and, maximize performance) and international defense industry synergies. 
(2) Technology transfer and intellectual property issues must be resolved through 
economic valuation of the technology as defined by the marginal benefit of the 
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technology transfer to the overall program.  A mutually agreed upon value must be 
assigned to transferred technology, otherwise, the costs of participation in a co-
development program may become so high that any (real or perceived) benefits are lost. 
(3) Cooperative production arrangements with Japan create economies of scale 
through expanded production and sharing of common overhead costs. 
 (4) Government-to-government and/or industry-to-industry collaboration in R&D 
might help to mitigate program risks and potentially add to the customer base for 
products that flow from the R&D effort.  A robust, collaborative R&D effort with Japan 
may also yield economic benefits in the form of commercial spin-off technologies and 
alliance synergies through fielding of interoperable defense systems. 
The U.S. - Japan acquisition environment provides a number of opportunities for 
synergies in acquisition of defense systems.   To effectively capture potential acquisition 
synergies, specific acquisition projects must be identified and evaluated.  Chapter IV 
outlines a methodology for identifying acquisition opportunities, and identifies 
acquisition opportunities for DoD in:  specific defense systems, general defense areas, 
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IV. ACQUISITION OPPORTUNITIES FOR DOD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An acquisition opportunity for DoD within the JDIB is defined as any opportunity 
for DoD to achieve best-value in its systems acquisition process through collaboration 
with Japan.  An examination of Japanese and U.S. acquisition plans identifies three 
specific, and three general, acquisition opportunities for DoD.   In addition to 
identification, acquisition opportunities may require further evaluation to determine:  (a) 
which opportunities to pursue and (b) what form of collaboration is optimal for a specific 
bilateral acquisition opportunity.  The researcher presents a tool for evaluation of 
acquisition opportunities and uses the tool to retroactively evaluate the FS-X project.  
(Alternative methods for assessment of acquisition opportunities are also provided.)  In 
addition to the factors considered in the tool, acquisition opportunities are framed by 
DoD acquisition policy.  Some elements of DoD policy present hurdles to collaborative 
projects and four of these hurdles are examined.  The first step in identification of 
acquisition opportunities is to identify any synergies between Japanese and U.S. 
acquisition plans. 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF SYNERGIES BETWEEN JAPANESE AND U.S 
ACQUISITION PLANS 
Japanese Acquisition Plans include recapitalization of the current force structure.   
Japan's current Mid-Term Defense Plan calls for R&D investment in replacements for:   
(a) the current Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft, (b) the current transport aircraft, (c) and 
the Main Battle Tank, in addition to (d) further development of Theater Missile Defense 
[Ref. 8 p. 4].  U.S. acquisition plans include three potential areas for bilateral synergy in 
the acquisition effort.  These areas are: (a) replacement of the current U.S. Anti-
Submarine Warfare aircraft (P-3C), (b) component development of mission systems in 
cargo aircraft, and (c) continued investment in Theater Missile Defense [Ref. 36 pp. 2-3].   
Each of these acquisition efforts is outlined below.  In addition to these three specific 
areas, less well-defined opportunities for bilateral cooperation are also presented. 
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1. Patrol Craft Experimental (P-X) and the Multi-mission Maritime 
Aircraft (MMA)  
The U.S. and Japan both use the P-3C family of aircraft to conduct airborne Anti-
Submarine Warfare.  Both nations also plan to replace these aging, propeller-driven, 
aircraft with an updated jet-powered version.  The Japanese effort is known as the Patrol 
Craft Experimental (P-X) and the U.S. effort is known as the Multi-Mission Maritime 
Aircraft (MMA).  The U.S. and Japan have similar development timelines with Japan 
planning for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2010 for the P-X and IOC for the 
MMA projected for 2010-2012.  The P-X and MMA would appear to offer significant 
opportunities for bilateral collaboration with Japan; however, difficulties have already 
arisen. 
Japanese officials tend to favor an indigenous development program for the P-X 
(i.e. the basic desire for kokusanka, especially in aerospace).  However, there is "wide-
spread skepticism among U.S. Government and industry officials over whether the JDA 
can really support indigenous efforts on (the) P-X.” [Ref. 35 p. 1].  The report of the 13th 
Annual U.S. Japan Technology Forum noted that:  "$265 million is being spent on next 
generation maritime patrol and transport aircraft, out of a total development budget of 
$2.6 billion - a figure that some U.S. participants questioned as unrealistically low." [Ref. 
7 p. 13].     
Japan's apparent lack of fiscal resources may inhibit indigenous development of 
the P-X aircraft.  This fiscal constraint may serve as the primary catalyst for greater 
bilateral cooperation.  Japan has shown a great deal of interest in cooperation concerning 
the MMA and is associated systems.  "U.S. - Japan interface on future MMA systems has 
been unprecedented in (the) beginning, from consideration of basic requirements, and 
progressing through concept exploration toward system development” (a degree of 
interaction that never occurred in the case of the FS-X). [Ref. 35 p. 1-2].  Japan plans to 
dovetail its P-X development program with its plan for replacement of its primary cargo 





2. Cargo Aircraft Experimental (C-X) and the MMA 
The JDA plans to replace its aging fleet of indigenously developed C-1 cargo 
aircraft with an updated cargo aircraft.  The C-1 is a “twin-engine, turbofan, medium size, 
medium-range troop and cargo transport aircraft.” [Ref. 23 p. 1].  The new cargo aircraft 
is called the Cargo Aircraft Experimental (C-X).  A Request for Proposals (RFP) was 
issued by JDA in May 2001.  "Foreign proposals for the C-X included Airbus A310, 
Boeing C-17, and Lockheed Martin C-130J, but Kawasaki (Heavy Industries Limited 
was) selected by JDA in November, 2001, to lead development of an indigenous design 
to meet both C-X and (P-X) requirements, with (an) optimum degree of structural 
commonality." [Ref. 24 p. 1].  C-X program objectives include:  a twin-turbofan power 
plant, increased range, and a payload capacity approximately double that of the 
Lockheed-Martin C-130J (the C-130 is also in service with the JDA).  "(D)esign 
parameters include high-mounted wing, rear-loading ramp/door, digital AFCS 
(Automatic Flight Control System) and 'glass cockpit' avionics; outer wing, flight deck, 
and tail unit (will) be common with (the P-X)." [Ibid p.  1]   
The JDA has devoted $2.6 billion for the development of both the C-X and the P-
X.  Exact specifications for the new aircraft have not been published. However, U.S. 
concerns about the C-X are similar to those expressed over the P-X development 
program.  DoD is doubtful that JDA possesses the fiscal resources to undertake a full 
indigenous aircraft development program.  The Boeing C-17 Globemaster-II was 
originally proposed as a replacement for the C-1.  Although the Boeing aircraft was 
rejected, Japanese requirements for a digital AFCS and "glass cockpit" may later develop 
into co-production or FMS-licensed production of similar U.S. components (e.g. C-17 or 
MMA mission systems). 
3. Theater Missile Defense 
Chapter III outlined a number of key benefits of TMD for both the U.S. and 
Japan.    The Report of the 13th Annual U.S. Japan Technology Forum noted that:  "the 
most important benefit of (bilateral cooperation in missile defense) is mutual exchange of 
beneficial technologies and a synergy between respective engineering capabilities.  The 
division of labor agreed upon by Boeing and MHI in the case of the MB-XX is consistent 
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with this viewpoint." [Ref. 7 p. 8].  Japanese firms are currently working on development 
of SM-3 missile that will serve as the intercept vehicle in the Sea-based Mid-Course 
Defense portion of the TMD system.  Thus, a JDIB product is a key component of the 
overall system.  
The Technology Forum noted that U.S. - Japan cooperation seems very likely to 
continue as both countries are committed to development of a missile defense system.  
TMD involves advanced technology development in the field of aerospace and aerospace 
is an area in which Japan has shown historical interest in collaborative programs.  TMD 
collaboration will most likely increase, as more government-to-government and industry-
to-industry relationships are formalized to facilitate development process.  JDA's fiscal 
problems will incentivize Japan to conduct collaborative TMD R&D with the U.S.   TMD 
could be a fully integrated, collaborative effort with Japan.  Japan's future level of 
participation in this program will most likely hinge on its ability to continue to contribute 
to the program (vis-à-vis constrained fiscal resources) and a continued commitment by 
the U.S. to field an interoperable system.    
4. Other Potential Areas for Bilateral Cooperation 
This section has described three specific areas for bilateral cooperation that all fall 
within the defense aerospace industry.  The researcher selected the P-X, C-X, and TMD 
for exposition because these projects had clearly defined, common, requirements.  Other 
areas for acquisition synergies exist, albeit in less well-defined forms: 
-JDA is leading an effort in the creation of Advanced Information and 
Communication networks.  This area includes tentative, bilateral, efforts in cyber security 
and biometric identification.  Efforts in the area will contribute to security of both 
military and non-military related IT resources.   
-MELCO is conducting development of a scalable, distributed simulation system.  
This system includes plans for a High Level Architecture/Run-Time Infrastructure 
(HLA/RTI) similar to a concept of HLA outlined in the DoD Modeling and Simulation 
Master Plan (DOD Directive 5000.59) published in January, 1994.  This system would 




-FHI is leading an effort that examines dual-use application of rotary-wing 
unmanned aerial vehicles.  [Ref. 7 pp.  2-10].  FHI already has a prototype model in use 
for spraying of agricultural pesticides. 
These areas are (potentially) of interest to both the U.S. and Japan.  A driving 
factor in bilateral development of these areas is the strong potential for advanced 
technology development.  Japanese firms are particularly interested in those areas with 
dual-use applications.  The acquisition opportunities in these areas are not currently tied 
to a specific DoD acquisition project and were therefore not selected for analysis.  
Interested readers may contact the Center for U.S. - Japan Studies and Cooperation, 
Vanderbilt University Institute for Business and Public Policy, Nashville, Tennessee, for 
additional information and updates in these areas.     
B. AN ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR EVALUATION OF ACQUISITION 
OPPORTUNITIES 
The preceding section outlined three specific projects wherein the U.S. and Japan 
might benefit from bilateral cooperation in defense acquisition.  However, the researcher 
was unable to find an existing assessment tool or methodology that would effectively 
assist DoD Program Managers in answering two basic collaboration questions: (1) which 
acquisition opportunities should DoD pursue and (2) what is the optimum type of 
collaboration for a specific bilateral acquisition opportunity.   In this section the 
researcher presents an assessment tool that is designed to help Program Managers answer 
these two basic questions.   
This tool was developed using by Dr. Mark Lorell's "Pros and Cons of 
Collaborative Programs"6 as a point of departure.  The subjective assessments in Dr. 
Lorell's model were used to develop detailed objectives for collaborative acquisition 
projects and subsequent evaluation of those objectives using an additive utility function 
as described in Robert T. Clemen's Making Hard Decisions [Ref. 9 pp. 536-560].  Use of 
the additive utility function in assessing the costs and benefits of acquisition projects with 
Japan will allow the Program Manager to rationally assign ordinal values to the 
comparison of acquisition alternatives.  A basic template of this tool is provided at 
                                                 
6 Dr. Lorell's model is reproduced at Appendix E. 
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Appendix F7.  The reader may find it useful to refer to this template during the following 
description of the tool.  Description of the tool begins with identification of four 
alternatives for collaboration. 
1. Four Alternatives for Collaboration 
The JDA normally procures defense items through one of the following five 
sources:  "(1) domestic development, (2) co-development with the United States, (3), 
Licensed Production, (4) Commercial Imports, and (5) Foreign Military Sales (FMS)." 
[Ref. 41 p. 1].   This tool focuses on three procurement sources that will require 
collaboration at both the government-to-government and industry-to-industry level.  
These three sources are:  Co-development, Licensed Production, and FMS.  These three 
sources form the first three alternatives for collaboration.  Each of these alternatives is 
defined below.   
  a.  Co-development 
Co-development is defined (by the researcher) as:  that form of 
collaboration wherein defense contractors from the U.S., Japan, and (possibly) other 
countries jointly design, develop, and (usually) produce a weapon system.  After-sales 
services of the jointly-developed systems may or may not be joint.  This form of 
collaboration involves sharing of costs over the life of the program to include R&D and 
production overhead costs [Ref. 47 and Ref. 29 p. 4].  The FS-X program is an example 
of Co-development. 
b. Licensed Production 
Licensed Production "involves U.S. companies’ use of munitions export 
licenses issued by the Department of State (after consultation with DoD and the 
Department of Commerce) to transfer the ability to produce U.S.-origin defense articles 
to either foreign governments or foreign companies.... the U.S.-origin defense articles 
proposed for licensed co-production may not even be in DoD use or may be a 
significantly modified version of DoD equipment in either development or production." 
[Ref. 47].   This tool assumes that derivative technologies developed as a part of the 
Licensed Production process will be shared and thus reduce the cost of improvements to 
                                                 
7 This tool was developed from an example presented in Ref. 9 (p. 556). 
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the weapons system.  An example of Licensed Production is the production of the 
Multiple-Launch Rocket system by Nissan Aerospace under license from the Lockheed-
Martin Corporation. 
c. FMS 
FMS is known as "FMS co-production" by DoD [Ref. 47].    For the 
purpose of this tool, the "FMS" alternative is defined as:  the sale of all or part of a 
weapon system for final assembly in Japan.  FMS is distinguished from Licensed 
Production in that the majority of the weapons' production and assembly takes place in 
the U.S.  This tool assumes that Japan may share some of the production overhead costs, 
but will not share any of the R&D costs for this type of collaboration.  An example of this 
type of collaboration is the Aegis AAW radar.  The radar is primarily assembled in the 
U.S. and a Japanese firm performs final installation on-board the designated vessel. 
d. Do not Collaborate 
The fourth alternative this tool considers is the alternative not to 
collaborate with Japan.  This alternative assumes that the marginal benefits and marginal 
costs of the other three alternatives were evaluated and none of the three collaboration 
alternatives showed a positive marginal benefit.       
2. Determination of Fundamental Objectives 
The next step in building this tool is to determine the fundamental objectives.  
DoD considers alternatives to any acquisition program that have been identified to meet 
military requirements by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the 
program and of the identified alternatives.  [Ref.  8].   This tool applies evaluation of cost, 
schedule, and performance in assignment three fundamental objectives.  These three 
fundamental objectives are:  (1) minimize cost, (2) minimize schedule risk, and (3) 
maximize performance. 
a. Minimize Cost 
When minimizing the cost of an acquisition program, the intent is not to 
just identify the cheapest alternative in terms of dollars programmed for expenditure.  
Rather, the Program Manager seeks to minimize cost in a manner that provides the best-
value to the overall acquisition process.  In evaluating the four possible collaboration 
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alternatives, this tool seeks to categorize the alternatives in relation to how they provide 
best value to the acquisition program in terms of overall cost minimization. 
b. Minimize Schedule Risk 
Proper time-phasing of acquisition efforts is critical to successful 
execution of an acquisition program.  Collaboration involves some inherent risks to the 
development schedule in that more players (be they partners or customers) are part of the 
program.  Aspects such as language or geography can create risks to the program 
schedule that are not present in a purely domestic effort.  The interest of external 
audiences (e.g. Congress) can also create schedule risk in a collaboration effort.  In 
evaluating the four possible collaboration alternatives, this tool seeks to assess the 
alternatives in terms of how they minimize schedule risk.  This tool assumes that there is 
always some schedule risk present in any acquisition project and, rather than try to 
eliminate risk, it is further assumed that it is more effective to manage risk through 
identification and minimization of risk factors. 
c. Maximize Performance 
Maximization of performance means that the form of collaboration 
selected provides the highest possible return in performance of the system.  Most 
acquisition programs establish key performance parameters that include both threshold 
(minimum) and objective (desired) levels of performance.  Maximization of performance 
will normally entail meeting objective levels of performance.  In evaluating the four 
collaboration alternatives, this tool seeks to assess the alternatives in terms of how they 
contribute to achievement of objective levels of performance.  
3. Determination of Detailed Objectives 
Detailed Objectives are those key elements that the decision maker considers for 
analysis of each fundamental objective on each alternative.  Collectively these detailed 
objectives define important elements of each fundamental objective.   Each collaborative 
acquisition effort might have its own set of detailed objectives.   Determination of 
detailed objectives is a subjective process that involves multiple inputs to the decision 
maker.   The decision maker must ask question such as:  "What are the key elements in 
minimizing cost in this program?", "What elements of collaboration will increase 
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schedule risk?", and "How can I maximize performance of this system through 
collaboration?".  The researcher identified a number of elements that were common to 
past acquisition interfaces with Japan.  These detailed objectives are neither all-inclusive 
nor universally applicable to all collaborative acquisition projects.  A fundamental 
objectives hierarchy is provided in Appendix G to illustrate the relationship between the 
fundamental and the detailed objectives.  
a. Detailed Objectives for Minimizing Cost 
(1) Share RDT&E Costs.  This detailed objective enables 
evaluation of the benefits of sharing RDT&E costs with Japan.  RDT&E costs are shared 
in co-development programs to a greater extent than in licensed production or FMS. 
(2) Gain Economies of Scale.  This detailed objective enables 
the evaluation of the impact of larger production quantities as a result of Japan and U.S. 
collaboration.  Essentially the larger production quantities will result in lower per-unit 
production costs.  Economies of Scale can be realized co-development, Licensed 
Production and FMS.  Economies of Scale can also be realized if the U.S. does not 
collaborate, provided the DoD requirement is so extensive that addition of a foreign 
customer will not significantly affect the per-unit production cost. 
(3) Take Advantage of the "Kokusanka Effect".  This detailed 
objective enables the evaluation of the impact of a collaborative effort versus domestic 
production by Japan.  Past acquisition interfaces indicate that Japan strongly favors 
cooperative development in particular areas (e.g. aerospace).  This objective can have a 
positive or negative connotation.  The positive aspect of this objective is that Japan may 
be dedicated to a collaborative effort in order to sustain the JDIB and gain access to 
advanced U.S. technologies (e.g. the TMD program).  The negative aspect of this 
objective is that Japan may drive program costs higher in an effort to make the 




(4) Maximize Technology Transfer Costs and Benefits.  This 
detailed objective enables the evaluation of the marginal benefit of technology transfer in 
the program under consideration.  If the U.S. benefits from the transfer of technology 
from Japan then this objective would favorably consider some form of co-development 
over the other alternatives.  If the a negative benefit is determined then Do not 
Collaborate might be the preferred alternative 
(5) Integrate Commercial Items and Best Practices.  This 
detailed objective enables the evaluation of the potential revenue benefits to U.S. and 
Japanese firms that might result from spin-off applications/dual-use applications.  JDIB 
interest in dual-use applications in a particular acquisition project may create 
opportunities for collaboration in co-development, Licensed Production, or FMS. 
b. Detailed Objectives for Minimizing Schedule Risk 
(1) Minimize Schedule Risks in Bilateral RDT&E.  This 
detailed objective enables evaluation of the impact of a collaborative RDT&E effort on 
the overall program schedule.  Past acquisition interfaces indicate that co-development 
programs create the greatest risk to the program schedule due primarily to the problems 
inherent in language, geography and the involvement of a larger sphere of development 
personnel. 
(2) Take Advantage of JDIB Proficiency.  This detailed 
objective enables evaluation of the impact of the JDIB's inherent characteristics on the 
development schedule.  The JDIB can have advanced proficiency in production of some 
component items (e.g. radar production for the FS-X) and this proficiency may lend itself 
to favorable evaluation of a co-production or licensed production alternative.  However, 
the JDIB's relatively small size and customer base may result in few proficiency 
advantages for DoD. 
 (3) Create Positive Congressional Interest.  This detailed 
objective enables evaluation of the impact of Congressional Interest on the progress of 
the program and the surety of funding.  If Congress views the collaborative effort as 
positive, this condition could tend to lessen schedule risk as Congress may be willing to 
allocate more resources to keep a program on schedule.  Conversely, adverse 
Congressional interest in the collaborative effort may create significant increases in 
 61
 
schedule risk as Congress seeks to exercise its oversight authority in collaborative 
programs. 
(4) Integrate Commercial Items and Best Practices.  This 
detailed objective enables the evaluation of the impact of synergies in application of 
commercial technologies in both countries to the acquisition project.  If the project under 
consideration can use already-developed commercial technologies, this will tend to 
mitigate schedule risk by reducing the developmental time required.   
c. Detailed Objectives for Maximizing Performance 
(1) Use Shared RDT&E to Maximize Performance   
This detailed objective enables evaluation of the potential benefits 
to system performance through cooperative RDT&E.  For example, Japan may possess 
the technology to significantly reduce the weight of an aircraft through application of 
advance composite material techniques.  If this were the case, then co-development of 
either:  the entire aircraft, flight control surfaces, or fuselage, might be a favored 
alternative. 
(2)  Enhance Interoperability   
This detailed objective enables evaluation of the impact of greater 
interoperability of equipment as a result of some form of collaboration.  Common 
equipment may encourage shared training and doctrine and thus enable more effective 
usage of the item. 
(3) Integrate Commercial Items and Best Practices   
This detailed objective enables the evaluation of the presence of 
existing commercial applications in either Japan or the U.S. that can enhance the 
performance of the system under consideration.  For example, both the U.S. and Japan 
are seeking ways to incorporate the rapid advancements in commercial communication 
devices (both voice and data) into military applications. 
   Thus far, the researcher has defined the fundamental and the detailed objectives.  
To effectively utilize this tool, it is necessary to describe the Program Manager's relative 
preferences among the objectives.  To describe these preferences, a weighting technique 
is employed to assign relative weights to each category of objectives. 
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4. Weighting the Objectives 
Weighting the fundamental objectives involves conducting a relative assessment 
of the fundamental objectives that reflects the Program Manager's preferences for each 
objective.  The “Swing Weighting” technique is employed in this tool.  Other procedures 
for weighting objectives include Pricing Out and Lottery Weighting.  Pricing Out and 
Lottery Weighting may also be used effectively to assign weights in this tool.  
Instructions on how to employ Pricing Out and Lottery Weighting are described in 
Reference 9. 
a. Swing Weighting the Fundamental Objectives 
Swing Weighting of the Fundamental Objectives requires the Program 
Manager to compare worst-case outcomes.  The first step in Swing Weighting is to create 
a matrix such as the one in Table 8 (see next page).  The first row is a "Benchmark" for 
the worst-case outcome.  In this tool, the worst-case outcome is highest cost, lowest 
performance, and most schedule risk.  In the second step, possible outcomes are 
described by "swinging" one of the objectives from worst to best.  Once the table is 
constructed, the third step is to assess each of the outcomes. 
The first step in assessment of the outcomes is to rank-order the outcomes.  
The benchmark is given the lowest rank as it reflects the worst possible outcome.  The 
other objectives are assessed to determine which ranks first, second, and third. 
The second step in assessment is to rate the outcomes based on the 
rankings.  Any scale may be used for this rating; however, the ratings should reflect a 
value commensurate with the rankings.  In Table 8, the researcher has ranked and rated 
performance maximization as the most important objective.  The researcher rated cost 
minimization as 75.  This implies that improving cost from worst to best is worth 75 
percent of the value that is gained by acquiring system that performs at or above 
objective requirements.   
The third step is to calculate the weight for each objective.  The weight is 
the ratio of the individual Rate to the sum of the Rates and is expressed as a percentage 
value.  These weights are transferred to the tool for inclusion in utility calculations.  This 
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process completes the weighting of the Fundamental Objectives.  The next step in 
constructing the tool is to weight the detailed objectives.   
Fundamental 
Objective 
Outcome Rank Rate Weight 
(Benchmark) 
Highest Cost, Worst Performance,  
Most Schedule Risk 
4 0 N/A 
Minimize 
Cost 
Lowest Cost, Worst Performance,  
Most Schedule Risk 




Least Schedule Risk, Highest Cost,  
Worst Performance 
3 51 22.6% 
Maximize 
Performance 
Best Performance, Most Schedule Risk, 
Highest Cost 
1 100 44.2% 
  Total 226 100% 
Table 8. Swing Weighting Matrix for Fundamental Objectives 
 
b. Swing Weighting the Detailed Objectives 
The researcher chose the Swing Weighting technique to weight the 
Detailed Objectives.  Other weighting techniques are equally applicable as noted in the 
previous section.  The methodology for Swing Weighting the Detailed Objectives is 
identical to the methodology employed for weighting the Fundamental Objectives.  Table 
9 (see next page) provides a sample matrix of weights for the Detailed Objectives 
associated with the Fundamental Objective-Maximize Performance. 
These weights are transferred to the tool for inclusion in the utility 
calculation.  Weighting of the Fundamental and Detailed Objectives completes the 
weighting process.  The next step in building the assessment tool is to assess the utility of 
each alternative in relation to each Detailed Objective.  
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5. Utility Scoring Methodology 
In addition to the weighting of objectives, the Additive Utility function requires 
the assessment of individual utility values for each alternative on each Detailed 
Objective.  Several techniques are available to assess utilities8.  The researcher selected a 
ratio comparison technique because it is "a particularly appropriate (technique) for 
attributes that are not naturally quantitative" [Ref. 9 p. 544]. 
Detailed Obj. Outcome Rank Rate Weight 
(Benchmark) 
Did not Use Shared RDT&E, 
Did not Integrate Comm. Items, 
Did not Enhance Interoperability. 
4 0 N/A 
Use Shared 
RDT&E 
Used Shared RDT&E, 
Did not Integrate Comm. Items, 
Did not Enhance Interoperability. 




Did not Use Shared RDT&E, 
Did not Integrate Comm. Items. 
 
3 20 10% 
Integrate 
Comm. Items 
Integrated Comm. Items, 
Did not Enhance Interoperability, 
Did not Use Shared RDT&E. 
 
2 80 40% 
  Total 200 100% 
Table 9. Swing Weighting Matrix for Detailed Objectives Associated with 
Maximizing Performance 
 In the ratio comparison technique, preferences are described by assigning relative 
values to each alternative within a detailed objective.  For example, within the 
Fundamental Objective-Minimize Cost, we want to describe the relative utility of each 
collaboration alternative as it relates to the Detailed Objective-Share RDT&E Costs.  The 
                                                 
8 See Ref. 9 for a sample of alternate techniques. 
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decision-maker could use a scale from 0 to 100 and make the following assessment: 
Co-development = 75, Licensed Production = 10, and FMS and Do not Collaborate = 0.  
This assessment indicates that the decision-maker thinks that co-development has the 
greatest utility in terms of sharing RDT&E costs, there is some potential for sharing 
RDT&E costs in Licensed Production, and there is no potential for cost sharing in FMS 
or Do not Collaborate.  Once this assessment is made the scores must be scaled so that 
they range from 0 to 1.   An explanation of the scaling technique is provided at Appendix 
H.  The resultant scaled scores are: Co-development = 1.0, Licensed Production = 0.13, 
and FMS and Do not Collaborate = 0.  These scores are transferred to the tool.  The next 
step in determining the utility of each alternative is to calculate the overall utility of each 
alternative. 
6. Calculation of Overall Utility 
The overall utility of each alternative is calculated using an additive utility 
function.  This function requires the multiplication of the individually scaled utilities by 
the applicable weights.  These products are then summed to determine and overall utility. 
a. Abbreviation Methodology 
  To formally express this function the researcher developed abbreviations 
for the Fundamental and Detailed Objectives.  Abbreviations used for the Fundamental 
Objectives are:  Minimize Cost(C), Minimize Schedule Risk(S), and Maximize 
Performance(P).  Each Detailed Objective was identified by sequentially numbering it 
within its Fundamental Objective.  For example, "Share RDT&E Costs" is the first 
Detailed Objective in the Fundamental Objective "Minimize Cost"; therefore, this 
Detailed Objective is identified as "C1".  The second Detailed Objective in Minimize 
Cost is "Gain Economies of Scale"; therefore this Detailed Objective is identified as 
"C2".   The remainder of the Detailed Objectives are abbreviated in this manner. 
The weights for the Objectives are identified using the letter "k" to denote 
a weight in combination with the abbreviation methodology described above.  For 
example, the weight associated with the Detailed Objective "Share RDT&E Costs" is 
abbreviated as "kC1".   
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The individual scaled utilities on each alternative associated with each 
Detailed Objective are identified using the letter "U", with an abbreviation identifying the 
alternative and the abbreviation methodology described above.  The alternatives are 
abbreviated as follows:  Co-development="dev", Licensed Production="pro", 
FMS="fms" and Do not Collaborate="dc".  For example, the abbreviation for the scaled 
utility value associated with the Fundamental Objective-Minimize Cost, the Detailed 
Objective, Share RDT&E Costs, and the alternative Co-development is abbreviated as: 
"Uc1dev".  
b. Overall Utility Equations 
Using this abbreviation methodology, the calculation for the overall utility 
for each alternative can be described by the following four equations: 
Equation #1:  Utility of Co-Development =  
(kC(kC1UC1dev + kC2UC2dev + kC3UC3dev + kC4UC4dev + kC5UC5dev)  +  
kS(kS1US1dev + kS2US2dev + kS3US3dev + kS4US4dev + kS5US5dev) + 
kP(kP1UP1dev + kP2UP2dev + kP3UP3dev + kP4UP4dev + kP5UP5dev))*1009 
 
Equation #2:  Utility of Licensed Production =  
(kC(kC1UC1pro + kC2UC2pro + kC3UC3pro + kC4UC4pro + kC5UC5pro)  +  
kS(kS1US1pro + kS2US2pro + kS3US3pro + kS4US4pro + kS5US5pro) + 
kP(kP1UP1pro + kP2UP2pro + kP3UP3pro + kP4UP4pro + kP5UP5pro))*100 
 
Equation #3:  Utility of Foreign Military Sales =  
(kC(kC1UC1fms + kC2UC2fms + kC3UC3fms + kC4UC4fms + kC5UC5fms)  +  
kS(kS1US1fms + kS2US2fms + kS3US3fms + kS4US4fms + kS5US5fms) + 
kP(kP1UP1fms + kP2UP2fms + kP3UP3fms + kP4UP4fms + kP5UP5fms))*100 
                                                 




Equation #4:  Utility of Do not Collaborate =  
(kC(kC1UC1dc + kC2UC2dc + kC3UC3dc + kC4UC4dc + kC5UC5dc)  +  
kS(kS1US1dc + kS2US2dc + kS3US3dc + kS4US4dc + kS5US5dc) + 
kP(kP1UP1dc + kP2UP2dc + kP3UP3dc + kP4UP4dc + kP5UP5dc))*100 
Upon completion of calculations, Equations 1-4 are compared and the alternative 
with the highest overall utility is the preferred alternative. 
In review, comparing the four collaboration alternatives is a seven-step process: 
Step 1 - Develop Fundamental and Detailed Objectives for the Acquisition 
Program. 
Step 2 - Organize the Fundamental and Detailed Objectives in a Fundamental 
Objectives Hierarchy. 
Step 3 - Weight the Fundamental Objectives. 
Step 4 - Weight the Detailed Objectives. 
Step 5 - Evaluate the alternatives on each Detailed Objective.10  
Step 6 - Calculate the overall utility of each alternative using Equations 1-4. 
Step 7 - Choose the alternative with the highest overall utility. 
This seven-step process results in the assignment of an objective utility value for 
each collaboration alternative.  This utility value incorporates cost only as cardinal 
parameter (i.e. higher or lower).  Collaboration costs may sometimes be estimated and 
these utility values are useful in evaluation of actual program cost as an attribute. 
7. Introducing Actual Program Cost as an Attribute 
In using this tool, the researcher included evaluation of cost only in a broad sense.  
The tool does not require the use of actual cost estimates to determine an overall utility 
for each alternative.  However, in the course of evaluating collaboration alternatives, 
Program Managers may develop a cost estimate for each collaboration alternative.  If a 
                                                 
10 Clemen recommends evaluating the attributes prior to determining the weights for the objectives.  
The researcher found that evaluating the alternatives first, provided an incentive to bias the weights.  
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cost can be assigned to each alternative, then a further assessment can be made.  The first 
step is to construct a Cost/Utility Assessment matrix such as the one presented in  
Table 10. 
The second step is to graph the cost and utility of each alternative with Cost on 






Co-development 130 57.06 
Licensed Production 150 29.24 
FMS 108 22.20 
Do not Collaborate 160 1.61 
Table 10. Cost/Utility Assessment Matrix 
 
Figure 1.   Cost versus Utility Graph 
 
The third step is to identify the presence of any dominating or dominated 
alternatives.  In the example presented at Figure (1), the alternative "Do not Collaborate" 
is clearly dominated by the other three alternatives because it has the greatest cost but the 

























Co-development because Co-development provides greater utility for less cost than 
Licensed Production.  Therefore, in this example, the Program Manager might narrow 
consideration of alternatives to include only Co-development and FMS.   
This three-step process identifies how introducing cost as an attribute can 
potentially help to narrow the field of alternatives.  When cost and utility are evaluated as 
presented in this tool, the Program Manager has an objective evaluation of collaboration 
alternatives.  However, the tool is not designed to function as a stand-alone element of 
the program management process and some critical assumptions must be made.  
8. Critical Assumptions of the Tool 
This tool can provide a program manager with a relative assessment of 
collaboration alternatives with Japan.  This tool employs several critical assumptions: 
(1) The individual(s) who prepares the tool understand(s) the theory behind 
additive utility. 
(2) In gathering data, the Program Office is consistent in its methodology for 
soliciting information about subjective preferences.  This assumption is particularly 
critical in the ratio-weighting portion of the utility calculation-inconsistent collection of 
preference data may result in skewed utility values. 
(3) This tool will be employed early enough in the acquisition process to allow for 
sufficient evaluation of all alternatives.  This assumption implies that the decision maker 
will use this tool early in the requirements development process11 to ensure that each 
alternative (e.g. co-development) is available for consideration and not eliminated due to 
program maturity. 
9.   What the Tool Does and Does Not Tell the Program Manager 
This tool can help the Program Manager to objectively evaluate collaboration 
alternatives by assigning an overall utility value to each alternative.  This tool is useful in 
that it provides a relative comparison of alternatives and represents the subjective 
preferences of the decision maker.  This tool cannot tell the Program Manager if the 
preferences are the right preferences for this acquisition project.  The tool also cannot 
                                                 
11 See Appendix I for a Model of the current DoD acquisition process 
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incorporate every objective of every stakeholder for a given acquisition project.  This tool 
simply provides a Program Manager with a snapshot in time of preferences for (or 
against) collaboration with Japan.  This snapshot may be useful in determining where to 
apply program resources in future phases of the acquisition process. In the next section, 
the researcher applies the tool to the FS-X program as demonstration of its usefulness in 
evaluating collaboration alternatives.   
C. APPLYING THE TOOL TO THE FS-X (F-2) 
This section provides a sample application of the assessment tool.  The researcher 
selected the FS-X program for application because the researcher the researcher was able 
to obtain adequate data from References 28 and 30 to make a sample assessment.  This 
application is presented using the seven-step method for determining the overall utility of 
each collaboration alternative: 
Step 1 - Develop Fundamental and Detailed Objectives for the Acquisition 
Program. 
Step 2 - Organize the Fundamental and Detailed Objectives in a Fundamental 
Objectives Hierarchy. 
Step 3 - Weight the Fundamental Objectives. 
Step 4 - Weight the Detailed Objectives. 
Step 5 - Evaluate the alternatives on each Detailed Objective.   
Step 6 - Calculate the overall utility of each alternative using Equations 1-4. 
Step 7 - Choose the alternative with the highest overall utility.  The completed 
assessment matrix is provided at Appendix J.  Prior to applying the tool, the researcher 
made four critical assumptions. 
1. Critical Assumptions 
The researcher made four critical assumptions to facilitate application of the 
assessment tool to the FS-X: 
(a) The researcher prepared this tool as if he were a staff member in the F-16 
program office in 1985.   
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(b) This staff member was required to analyze four collaboration alternatives with 
Japan and make a recommendation on which alternative would best fulfill DoD's primary 
objective (i.e. stopping indigenous development of a Japanese fighter).   
(c) The staff member accepted the Fundamental Objectives, the Detailed 
Objectives, and the Objectives hierarchy as presented in the previous section.   
(d) The staff member conducted some preliminary research and was able to 
determine that Japan did have some advanced technologies that might create added value 
to the F-16 program.  
Before moving to Step 3 (weighting the Fundamental Objectives) the staff 
member decided to clearly define what each collaboration alternative actually meant in 
the FS-X program.   
2. Defining the Alternatives 
The four collaboration alternatives selected for analysis were:  Co-development, 
Licensed Production, FMS, and Do not Collaborate.  Each of these alternatives is more 
precisely defined below: 
(a) Co-development:  This alternative involves U.S. - Japan development of an 
aircraft loosely based on the F-16 airframe.  The aircraft would mostly contain systems 
that were either developed or licensed-produced in Japan.  While the aircraft would 
outwardly resemble an F-16, its power plant, avionics, and flight control systems, would 
be the result of an extensive R&D effort by both the U.S. and Japan and would result in a 
radically updated version of the F-16.  
(b) Licensed Production:  This alternative involves U.S. sharing of F-16 
technologies to allow for production of a "minimally modified" F-16 by a Japanese 
manufacturer.  The manufacturer would most likely be a consortium headed by MHI.  
"Minimally modified" implies that Japan might include changes to the F-16 like 
incorporation of its Active Phased Array (APA) antennas.  Selection of this alternative 
would imply that most component items would be fully assembled in Japan with more 
than 51% of the components produced by a Japanese manufacturer (this includes 
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components that were indigenously developed and those manufactured under license (e.g. 
the engine)). 
(c) FMS:  This alternative involves selling a partially assembled F-16 to Japan.  
Like the Licensed Production alternative, this alternative might include minimal 
modifications to the aircraft (e.g. incorporation of the APA).  This alternative implies that 
most of the component items would be manufactured and fully assembled in the U.S. and 
a Japanese manufacturer would produce less than 51% of the components.  Final 
assembly of the aircraft would take place in Japan (probably done by MHI).  In essence, 
this alternative involves selling Japan an F-16C that incorporated some Japanese 
technologies but; most F-16 technologies would be "black-boxed" and the Japanese 
would not have access to detailed information (i.e. the Japanese would probably be 
unable to "reverse engineer" the technology for future civilian or military aerospace 
applications). 
(d) Do not Collaborate:  This alternative implies that Japan will indigenously 
develop its own fighter aircraft.  In this alternative, the analysis considers the marginal 
benefit of preventing aircraft development (DoD's goal) against the marginal cost of 
giving Japan access to F-16 technology (a Congressional concern).   
The next step in building the tool was to weight the Fundamental Objectives. 
3. Weighting Fundamental Objectives 
The primary consideration in weighting the fundamental objectives is to 
incorporate DoD's goal of thwarting indigenous development of a Japanese fighter 
aircraft.  To this end, maximization of performance was given the greatest weight at 50 
percent.  This weighting emphasizes that DoD can provide a proven airframe and that is 
scalable and expandable to Japanese defense needs.  Interoperability with U.S. systems 
would also allow Japan to reap performance benefits from upgrades to later F-16 
versions. 
Cost was weighted at 30 percent and this reflects the reality of Japanese defense 
spending.  Japanese defense spending is constrained by the unofficial "1 percent of GDP 
cap" and this means that is a recurrent issue for Japan in procurement of major weapons 
systems.  Although Japan wants a significantly improved aircraft (over its F-1), it has to 
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consider the procurement costs within the confines of a relatively small procurement 
budget. 
Schedule Risk was weighted at 20 percent.  Japan is willing to undertake a ten-
year development process in order to get the type of aircraft they want.  Therefore, it is 
assumed that increased schedule risk is an acceptable factor given that the proposed 
aircraft provides the desired level of performance at a reasonable cost.  However, Japan 
has a fleet of aging fighter aircraft and Japan risks having fighter aircraft that are not 
comparable to its regional rivals in the near-term; therefore, Schedule Risk was not 
discounted entirely. 
The next step in tool development was to weight the Detailed Objectives   
4. Weighting the Detailed Objectives 
a. Detailed Objective Weights for Minimizing Cost 
Taking advantage of the Kokusanka Effect was assessed as the key 
element in gaining best-value for this collaborative project and was given a weight of 
41.7 percent.  There is a strong desire in Japan to obtain advanced aerospace 
technologies.  Both Japanese government and industry heavily favor purely indigenous 
production of the aircraft.  Indigenous production by Japan will tend to push up unit costs 
because Japanese industry does not enjoy the scale or experience of U.S. industries and a 
collaboration alternative that takes advantage of the Kokusanka Effect might prove 
beneficial to both sides. 
Maximizing Technology Transfer Costs and Benefits was weighted at 33.3 
percent in recognition of the U.S. desire to gain some benefit from transferring advanced 
F-16 technologies to Japan.  This weight also reflects the potential gain from the 
flowback of derived technologies from the Japanese side. 
The Detailed Objectives:  Share RDT&E Costs, Gain Economies of Scale, 
and Integrate Commercial Items and Best Practices; were given equal weights of 8.3 
percent.  While each of these objectives is important, they are intrinsic to the existing F-
16 program and it is assumed these objectives were previously optimized. 
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b. Detailed Objective Weights for Minimizing Schedule Risk 
Creating positive Congressional Interest was given the greatest weight of 
55.6 percent.  This weighting reflects Congressional concerns over parity in technology 
transfer on this project.  Congress could impede the progress of the program through 
regulatory measures and hearings on various aspects of development.  Creating positive 
Congressional Interest would be essential to assure a reasonable development and 
production schedule. 
Taking advantage of JDIB Proficiency was given the next greatest weight 
at 33.3 percent.  This weight recognizes the need to select a collaboration alternative that 
allows the program to build upon advanced Japanese technologies (e.g. the APA radar).  
Through incorporation of the best of Japanese technologies, program schedule risk could 
be mitigated. 
The Detailed Objectives for minimizing bilateral RDT&E risks and 
integration of commercial items and best practices; were given equal weights of 5.6%.  
The bilateral RDT&E weight recognizes the U.S.' desire for Japan to use a minimally 
modified F-16 that does not require extensive RDT&E.  Integration of commercial items 
and best practices to mitigate risk is assessed as already present in both countries' 
development efforts, although new commercial items and practices may be available for 
integration later.   
c. Detailed Objective Weights for Maximizing Performance 
The Detailed Objective "Enhance Interoperability" was given the greatest 
weight at 62.5 percent.  By bringing Japan into the F-16 program, the U.S. could benefit 
through shared training and doctrine.  Greater interoperability between the Air Forces of 
the two countries could strengthen political ties and serve as catalyst for more combined 
maneuvers/exercises.  Japan could provide feedback on aircraft performance 
characteristics and contribute to continued improvement of the aircraft. 
Using shared RDT&E was rated at 31.3 percent because this was the key 
objective in the minimal RDT&E effort that the U.S. wanted.  This weight reflects the 
desire to use existing RDT&E efforts in both countries to create an aircraft which 
functions at or above objective levels of performance.  
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Integration of commercial items and best practices was rated at 6.3 percent 
because commercial items and practices were assessed as having only minimal impact on 
the performance characteristics of the existing aircraft.  In this program, commercial 
items and practices will probably have a greater impact in reducing procurement costs 
and schedule risks than in enhancing performance. 
5. Scoring Individual Utilities on the Detailed Objectives12 
a. Detailed Objectives for Minimizing Cost 
(1) Share RDT&E Costs.  The U.S. would prefer not to engage 
in a major R&D effort.  However, if it were necessary to undertake major R&D for this 
program the U.S. would most likely prefer some form of co-development in order to 
equitably spread the R&D costs between both countries.  This preference would be 
followed by a limited R&D effort to improve existing processes in a Licensed Production 
alternative.  The remaining alternatives hold no utility for sharing R&D costs. 
(2) Gain Economies of Scale.  The U.S. would gain the 
greatest utility in this objective through the FMS alternative.  This utility reflects the fact 
that most components would be manufactured and assembled in the U.S.  Licensed 
Production has the next greatest utility because the U.S. would still produce some 
components.  Do not collaborate has some utility in this objective because the U.S. might 
lose some cost savings if it entered co-development with a Japanese manufacturer who 
had higher overhead costs and/or less experience.  Therefore, Do not Collaborate has 
more utility than co-development. 
(3) Take Advantage of the "Kokusanka Effect".  Japanese 
industry and government heavily favor indigenous development of this aircraft because it 
is viewed in the JDIB as the cornerstone of future Japanese defense aerospace R&D.  
Therefore, co-development was given the highest utility.  Licensed Production and FMS 
are seen as more favorable to the U.S., but less likely to ameliorate Japanese concerns 
over indigenous development.  If the U.S. elects not to collaborate, then there is no 
attempt to meet this objective.  
                                                 
12 This section gives the researcher's rationale for scoring.  Actual scores can be found in Appendix J 
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(4) Maximize Technology Transfer Costs and Benefits.  FMS 
is the preferred U.S. alternative for this objective.  Although Japan possesses some 
advanced radar technologies, and may provide flowback of derived technologies; the U.S. 
will probably benefit from "black-boxing" as many of the F-16 technologies as possible.  
In terms of this objective, Do not Collaborate is probably favored over Licensed 
Production because Licensed Production would likely involve a great deal of technology 
transfer with no guarantee of flowback of equally sophisticated Japanese technologies.  
Co-development is assessed as having no utility in achievement of this objective. 
(5) Integrate Commercial Items and Best Practices.  There 
appears to be very little direct application of commercial technologies in this project. 
Some process improvements might be realized in Licensed Production or FMS, however, 
the utility of these improvements would most likely be very limited.   
b. Detailed Objectives for Minimizing Schedule Risk 
 (1) Minimize Schedule Risks in Bilateral RDT&E.  For the 
U.S. side, FMS provides the least schedule risk because RDT&E requirements will flow 
from the need to integrate any Japanese components.  However, Japan seems more likely 
to agree to a slightly more expansive RDT&E effort.  Therefore, Licensed Production 
seems to have slightly greater utility in achievement of this objective than FMS.  If the 
U.S. chooses not to collaborate, then there is no schedule risk but this might be an equal 
trade-off when compared to the relatively minimal schedule risks implied in FMS and 
Licensed Production.  Full co-development presents significant schedule risk, but is an 
alternative that Japan probably favors; even if this means extended development and 
procurement schedules. 
(2) Take Advantage of JDIB Proficiency.  FMS and Licensed 
Production seem to provide equal utility for the U.S. Both of these alternatives provide 
for Japanese production of some components.  Japan seems more likely to favor co-
development, but the U.S. could probably make a compelling case that Licensed 
Production would more effectively balance the Japan's desire for indigenous development 
with the recognition that the small size and scale of the JDIB substantially increases unit 




(3)  Create Positive Congressional Interest.  Congress is 
currently not in favor of this program and sees it as a "give-away" of U.S. technology.  
The alternative with the highest overall utility for DoD is to simply abandon a 
collaborative effort altogether.  However, if some sort of FMS alternative was negotiated 
that created more aircraft production in key Congressional districts, then this alternative 
might enable achievement of the DoD objective and create positive (vice the current 
negative) Congressional Interest. 
(4) Integrate Commercial Items and Best Practices.  
Commercial items and best practices are seen as having limited utility within this 
objective.  Future integration of best commercial manufacturing practices might help to 
speed the component production process in Licensed Production or FMS.   
c. Detailed Objectives for Maximizing Performance 
(1) Use Shared RDT&E to Maximize Performance.  Japan 
heavily favors an extensive RDT&E effort to create a high-performance fighter that is 
"essentially" Japanese.  A co-development program would provide the greatest 
opportunity to find performance improvements in the F-16 program.  The limited nature 
of RDT&E in Licensed Production and FMS would probably provide only marginal 
increases to performance. 
(2)  Enhance Interoperability.  FMS has the greatest utility for 
DoD in achievement of this objective.  The FMS alternative would provide a minimally-
modified F-16C to Japan and provide the opportunity for synergies in training and 
doctrine.  Some utility might be present in Licensed Production alternative as well, but 
there would likely be a great deal of variation in models.  Co-development would 
probably result in an aircraft that was substantially different from the F-16 and any 
interoperability synergies would be minimal. 
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(3) Integrate Commercial Items and Best Practices.  Integration 
of commercial items and best practices to maximize performance has limited application 
in this aircraft.  Some performance enhancements might "spin-on" from the commercial 
sector in an extensive co-development program.  The JDIB may have some contributions 
to aircraft manufacturing process (e.g. using composites materials) in a Licensed 
Production or FMS alternative, but the value of these potential contributions is assessed 
as very limited. 
6. Calculation of Overall Utility 
Additive Utility Theory was used to calculate the overall utility of each alternative 
based on the criteria outlined above.  The following utility values were determined: 
Co-development:  23.50 
Licensed Production:  55.87 
FMS:  72.38 
Do not Collaborate:  18.95 
7. Assessment of the Preferred Alternative 
FMS is the favored form of collaboration followed by Licensed Production.  
Some form of collaboration is probably favorable given the relatively low score for Do 
not Collaborate.  Although Japan favors indigenous development or co-development, 
Licensed Production may prove to be a form of collaboration that Japan is willing to 
consider if DoD can resolve technology transfer issues to the satisfaction of both Japan 
and Congress.  An FMS package that incorporated significant cost savings to Japan (i.e. 
passing and economy of scale savings along to Japan in the form of lower per unit aircraft 
price) might mitigate Japanese concerns over losing industrial base developmental 
capability.  Although FMS is DoD's favored alternative, a Licensed Production 
alternative seems more likely to facilitate DoD's goal for this program. 
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D. OTHER TOOLS FOR ASSESSSMENT OF ACQUISITION 
OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Software Alternatives 
Clemen recommends using a software package entitled "Logical Decisions" in 
decision situations involving multiple objectives.  "The starting point in this program is to 
create a fundamental objectives hierarchy." [Ref. 9 p. 83].  This software package closely 
parallels the researcher's tool and it "permit(s) the user to specify attribute scales, identify 
alternatives, and to indicate how each alternative is evaluated on each attribute" [Ibid p.  
83].  This software may be useful to a Program Manager who does not favor the use of 
ratio weighting or some other "manual" form of scoring the utilities on each collaboration 
alternative.  This software is available on the World Wide Web at: 
http://www.logicaldecisions.com. 
Another applicable software alternative is entitled "Expert Choice".  This software 
is similar to Logical Decisions.  Expert Choice uses the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP).  "AHP assists with the decision making process by allowing decision makers to 
organize and evaluate the significance of criteria (objectives) and alternative solutions of 
a decision" [Ref. 45 p.  11].  This software is more sophisticated than the researcher's tool 
in that it allows the decision maker to "do what-if or graphical sensitivity analysis to 
quickly determine how a change in the importance of an objective may influence the 
alternatives of choice." [Ibid p.  11].  This software is recommended if the program under 
consideration requires (and has data to support) graphical sensitivity analysis.  This 
software is in wide use in the U.S. Government (including the military departments).  
Information on how to obtain Expert Choice software is available on the World Wide 
Web at http://www.expertchoice.com. 
2. Value-focused Thinking 
Value-focused Thinking is "a philosophical approach for guiding and integrating 
your decision-making activities." [Ref. 27 p.  1].  Value-focused Thinking is a method to 
link program objectives and overall defense procurement strategy with determination of 
alternatives for international collaboration.  Value-focused Thinking might enable a 
program manager to develop other collaboration alternatives than the ones presented here 
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(or combinations of the alternatives presented here).  These collaboration alternatives 
might be more directly linked to long-term DoD acquisition strategies.   
Value-focused Thinking provides the Program Manager with a different decision 
support tool than the alternative-focused tool developed by the researcher.  "Value-
focused thinking is a way to identify desirable decision situations and then reap the 
benefits of these situations by solving them" [Ibid p.  2].  The researcher found that the 
Value-focused thinking approach was useful in evaluation of the collaboration 
alternatives on each detailed objective (i.e. Step 5 of the tool development process).  
Procedures for implementing Value-focused thinking in decision-making can be found in 
Value-Focused Thinking:  A Path to Creative Decision-making by Ralph L. Kenney.  For 
an example of military application of Value-focused thinking see:  "An Operational 
Analysis for Air Force 2025: An Application of Value-Focused Thinking to Future Air 
and Space Capabilities" available on the World Wide Web at 
http://papers.maxwell.af.mil.   
Software alternatives and Value-focused Thinking are alternative methods for 
evaluation of acquisition opportunities with Japan.  Evaluation of collaboration 
alternatives involves the assessment of the relative costs and benefits of each acquisition 
opportunity.  Acquisition opportunities exist in the form of specific weapons' programs.  
There are also opportunities to develop acquisition policies with Japan that enable 
optimization of collaborative efforts. 
E. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACQUSITION POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter has outlined several acquisition opportunities for DoD within the 
JDIB, and has described a tool (and alternatives) for evaluating these opportunities.  DoD 
should also evaluate the impact of current acquisition polices on development of bilateral 
acquisition opportunities.  The researcher identified four potential hurdles to 
maximization of acquisition opportunities with Japan:  (1) constraints imposed by the 
Three Principles on Arms Export, (2) inadequate involvement by JDA in the 
requirements development process, (3) absence of a General Security of Military 
Information Agreement (GSOMIA), and (4) complex rules and regulations governing 
acquisition projects with Japan.   
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1. Three Principles on Arms Export 
The Three Principles on Arms Export inhibit Japan's ability to conduct 
international collaboration in weapons' procurement.  The principles themselves are 
somewhat antiquated in referring to a "communist bloc" and may need to be revised to 
more clearly reflect Japan's resistance to arms export to "non-aligned" nations.  In any 
form, the Three Principles have a fundamental impact on the evaluation of collaboration 
alternatives.  This fundamental impact is that the Three Principles eliminate a 
collaboration alternative from consideration.  The eliminated alternative is reciprocal 
trade. 
Lorell defines reciprocal trade as an agreement between governments wherein 
"each government agrees to purchase weapons or weapons systems developed and 
produced by defense contractors in the partner country." [Ref. 29 p. 4].   This type of 
collaboration is strongly favored by the U.S.' transatlantic acquisition partners (e.g. 
Germany and the United Kingdom).  Japan's restriction on arms exports disincentivizes 
the JDIB from participation in this type of program.  While Japan can import weapons 
from the U.S. and co-develop (or co-produce) weapons with the U.S.; Japan cannot 
export weapons to the U.S.  This restriction significantly decreases the economic 
incentive to engage in any sort of reciprocal trade agreement. 
The Three Principles are an impediment to a full and open weapons' acquisition 
market with Japan.  The U.S. would benefit from amendment of the Three Principles in 
that amendment might allow for a collaborative weapons' acquisition environment that 
more closely approximates that of the U.S.'s transatlantic partners.  Unless and until the 
Three Principles are revised, Japan will be viewed by the U.S. as a second-tier player 
when compared to the U.S.' transatlantic acquisition partners.  The constraints imposed 
by the Three Principles also create a hurdle to development of long-term acquisition 
plans and this hurdle is discussed in the next section. 
2. Inadequate JDA Involvement in Requirements Development  
Japan and the U.S. have "more common equipment than any other U.S. 
friend/ally" [Ref. 43 p.  5].  Despite this commonality, the U.S. maintains its de facto role 
as a provider of security assistance rather than as a true acquisition partner with Japan.  
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The U.S. stance is reflected in "(e)xcessive use of bureaucratic FMS procedures; (and) 
arbitrary restrictions on release of U.S. systems/technologies." [Ibid p.  6].  This type of 
relationship fosters a climate in which there is little long-term acquisition policy 
coordination between JDA and DoD.  Specifically, there is no on-going "requirements 
dialogue on common interests in future defense systems." [Ibid p.  8].  The absence of a 
requirements dialogue has generated an ad-hoc, program-to-program policy structure 
with no institutional history.  The U.S. and Japan effectively "reinvent the wheel" for 
each new cooperative program.   
 Acquisition opportunities for the U.S. and Japan could be more readily 
evaluated if a strategic dialogue was present that "considers not only existing defense 
plans (e.g. Quadrennial Defense Review and the MTDP)"., but also considers "(the) 
impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs, future roles and missions for U.S. and 
Japanese forces, and appropriate force structures in the Asia/Pacific region" [Ibid p.  9].   
 DoD would benefit from this type of strategic dialogue in that it might 
provide a "more flexible approach to (Japanese) arms export policies" [Ibid p.  11].  DoD 
may find that an on-going requirements dialogue creates process improvements through 
conclusion of less restrictive MOUs and creates greater interface between program 
offices and defense firms in both countries [Ibid p.  11].  Continued absence of this type 
of dialogue may hobble future acquisition efforts as defense systems become more 
complex (and costly) and the ad-hoc U.S. - Japan arrangement is viewed as too unwieldy 
to cope with complicated defense acquisition projects.  The increasingly complex nature 
of defense acquisition projects and problems with the Japan-U.S. acquisition interface are 
also reflected in discussion of the next hurdle, absence of a General Security of Military 
Information Agreement. 
3. Absence of a GSOMIA 
The absence of a General Security of Military Information Agreement with Japan 
hobbles the acquisition development process.   The absence of a GSOMIA has been an 
issue between the U.S. and Japan since the 1980s.  The U.S. and Japan have collaborated 
on projects that required the sharing of sensitive information (e.g. the TDP for the F-16 
during the FS-X program) and both U.S. and Japanese officials agree:  "GSOMIA 
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requirements were being met in practice on U.S. - Japanese programs (however,) GOJ 
officials (have) cited political controversy over any apparent tightening of Japanese 
regulatory controls." [Ref. 33 p. 1].   In the absence of a GSOMIA, "the U.S. and Japan 
have continued to negotiate generic security of information provisions for each licensed 
production and R&D project [Ibid p. 2].  The most serious impact of the lack of a 
GSOMIA is that it "inhibits the exploration of cooperation in future programs" [Ibid p.  
2].  DoD would benefit from conclusion of a GSOMIA because its presence would 
"facilitate the development and negotiation of MOUs for cooperative programs as well as 
encourage exchanges of information on future defense planning and requirements [Ibid p.  
2].  A GSOMIA would essentially place Japan on an equal footing with other U.S. allies 
in evaluating synergies in the defense acquisition process.  Conclusion of a GSOMIA 
might also facilitate overcoming the last hurdle described in this section, regulatory 
reform.  
4. Reform and of Rules and Regulations Governing Acquisition Projects 
with Japan 
Two regulations that govern the collaborative acquisition process with Japan are 
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).    
The U.S. and Japan collaborative process is necessarily complicated by environmental 
factors (e.g. language differences and organizational structure differences) and these 
regulations both inhibit and promote participation in collaborative programs.  Selected 
portions of each regulation are examined with respect to their impact on the U.S. - Japan 
acquisition environment. 
 a. AECA  
 FMS co-production is a collaboration alternative and the AECA is the 
statutory basis for the conduct of FMS.   
The AECA came into being under a different title, i.e., the Foreign 
Military Sales Act of 1968 (FMSA). Before 1968, the basic authority for 
foreign military sales was the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  The FMSA 
served to incorporate the Foreign Military Sales Program under a new and 
separate act. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976 changed the title of the FMSA to the AECA.  This 
1976 Act also repealed Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 
(which provided authority for commercial licensing through the 
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International Traffic in Arms Regulations); this authority was placed in a 
new Section 38 (Control of Arms Exports and Imports) of the AECA 
which governs the licensing and sale of items through direct commercial 
channels [Ref. 47, "Green Book", Chap 3]. 
The AECA is a complex document that requires a detailed knowledge of 
its contents to successfully comply with all of its provisions.  While many of the 
provisions of the AECA may be necessary to ensure adequate control of arms exports, 
some provisions might be waived or otherwise modified to enable more efficient 
collaboration with Japan.  
b. Federal Acquisition Regulations 
The Federal Acquisition Regulations System is established for the 
codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for 
acquisition by all executive agencies.  The Federal Acquisition 
Regulations System consists of the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR), which is the primary document, and agency acquisition regulations 
that implement or supplement the FAR. [Ibid, Part 1].   
Several sections of the FAR relate directly to the hurdles previously 
discussed in this section.  The following paragraphs outlined selected FAR sections that 
apply to the U.S. - Japan acquisition environment. 
(1) FAR Part 4.402.  The FAR Part 4.402 deals with the 
security of defense information.  Specifically, the FAR Part 4.402 states that DoD is 
responsible for implementation of  "(p)rocedures for the protection of information 
relating to foreign classified contracts awarded to U.S. industry, and instructions for the 
protection of U.S. information relating to classified contracts awarded to foreign firms, 
are prescribed in Chapter 10 of the National Industrial Security Program Operating 
Manual." [Ibid, FAR, Part 4].  As noted previously, the absence of a GSOMIA may 
inhibit compliance with this portion of the FAR.  Technology transfer issues may also be 
an issue that relates to compliance with this portion of the FAR.  FMS procedures with 
Japan might be streamlined through conclusion of standardized MOUs that address the 
security requirements outlined in the FAR Part 4.402. 
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(2) FAR Parts 9.602 and 9.603.  FAR Parts 9.602 and 9.603 
advocate contractor teaming (where appropriate) in acquisition projects.  Contractor 
teaming is defined as:  "Two or more companies form a partnership or joint venture to act 
as a potential prime contractor; or a potential prime contractor agrees with one or more 
other companies to have them act as its subcontractors under a specified Government 
contract or acquisition program." [Ibid, FAR, Part 9].  FAR Part 9.602 goes on to say that 
contractor teaming is a desirable arrangement from both a government and industry 
perspective because teaming  
enables the companies involved to:  (1) Complement each other’s unique 
capabilities, and (2) Offer the Government the best combination of 
performance, cost, and delivery for the system or product being acquired 
[Ibid, Part 9]. 
FAR Parts 9.603 and 9.603 emphasize DoD's desire to achieve the Fundamental 
Objectives outlined earlier in this Chapter.  For selected acquisition projects, contractor 
teaming between U.S. and Japanese firms may facilitate optimization of DoD program 
objectives. 
(3) FAR Part 25.407.  The FAR Part 25.407 outlines a standing 
wavier for Japan from the Buy American Act13.  Specifically, this section waives the Buy 
American Act for trade in Civil Aircraft for 23 countries, including Japan.  This section 
of the FAR is particularly relevant given Japan's emphasis on domestic aerospace 
development and the potential for spin-on technologies in military aircraft.  This wavier 
might be further expanded to include provisions for military aircraft based on civilian 
airframes (e.g. a Boeing 707 airframe for the P-X). 
The AECA and the FAR are only two of the regulations that govern collaborative 
acquisition projects.  The AECA and the FAR can provide the Program Manager with a 
basic knowledge of the regulatory implications of collaboration with Japan.  More 
detailed information on regulations governing acquisition projects with Japan is available 
via the website listed at Reference 47. 
                                                 
13 The Buy American Act restricts "the purchase of supplies, that are not domestic end products, for 
use within the United States" [Ref. 47, FAR, Part 25].  
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Specific acquisition opportunities exist for DoD in:  the P-X program, the C-X 
program, and the TMD program.  General acquisition opportunities exist for DoD in 
biometric identification, distributed simulation, and rotary-wing, unmanned aerial 
vehicles.  Four alternatives for collaboration are available to the Program Manager:  co-
development, co-production, FMS, or don't collaborate.  Analysis of these alternatives 
will provide the Program Manager with an assessment of how collaboration with Japan 
might (or might not) help to achieve best-value in the acquisition process.  Program 
Managers may use the researcher's assessment tool to evaluate collaboration alternatives 
with Japan.    Acquisition policy has an overarching impact on the implementation of a 
preferred alternative.  Acquisition policy frames the collaborative acquisition 
environment and Program Managers must be cognizant of the policy issues that impact 
potential acquisition opportunities.  Acquisition opportunities exist for DoD within the 
JDIB and careful evaluation of these opportunities will likely create an acquisition 












V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This purpose of this thesis was to provide DoD Program Managers with a baseline 
analysis of the JDIB.   There are significant differences between the USDIB and the 
JDIB, most notably that the JDIB is significantly smaller than the USDIB and firms in the 
JDIB operate in a virtually non-competitive environment.  Despite these differences, 
similarities do exist between the two industrial bases and these similarities provide 
opportunities for cooperation in weapons' acquisition.  In developing this baseline 
analysis the researcher was able to derive several conclusions in pursuit of the primary 
and secondary research questions. 
1. General Conclusions 
General Conclusion #1:  Japan and the U.S. will probably continue to maintain 
similar, defense-related equipment in the long-term.  This commonality of equipment will 
create regular opportunities to cooperate on acquisition projects 
General Conclusion #2:  Specific acquisition opportunities exist for DoD in co-
development projects that involve maritime patrol aircraft, transport aircraft, and missile 
defense.   Evaluation of key program elements (i.e. cost, schedule, and performance) will 
assist Program Managers in deciding if, and how, to collaborate with Japan. 
2. Specific Conclusions 
Specific Conclusion #1:  The JDIB can effectively interact with the USDIB on 
acquisition projects.  However, the JDIB's growth potential is severely limited by Japan's 
current policies on arms exports (i.e. the Three Principles). 
Specific Conclusion #2:  Past economic factors that have influenced the U.S. 
Japan interface include:  (a) synchronization of macroeconomic issues with DoD 
acquisition program goals; (b) proper valuation of technology when it is transferred as a 
part of a collaborative process; (c) optimization of gains through economies of scale and 
shared overhead costs in production and; (d) use of collaborative R&D to help mitigate 
program risk and add to the customer base (thus lowering total program cost). 
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Specific Conclusion #3:  The most likely area for future acquisition interface with 
the JDIB is in defense aerospace. 
Specific Conclusion #4:  Program Managers can evaluate the costs and benefits of 
collaborative projects with Japan using additive utility theory, value-focused thinking, or 
commercially available decision support software.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
1. Seek Out Acquisition Opportunities with Japan and Evaluate Them 
DoD Program Managers should seek out acquisition opportunities with the JDIB 
in order to promote best-value acquisition of weapons' systems.  These opportunities 
should be evaluated for their relative cost and benefits to determine what form of 
collaboration is desired.  The evaluation may determine that collaboration with the JDIB 
is not desired. 
2. Focus Collaborative Efforts in Defense Aerospace 
The three specific areas identified as acquisition opportunities for the U.S. and 
Japan all fall in the general category of defense aerospace.  Japan's preference for 
collaboration in these types of programs has been established through historical 
precedent.  DoD can optimize cost, schedule and performance parameters in aerospace 
programs through continued collaboration with Japan 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis provides only a baseline analysis of the JDIB and it did not provide a 
detailed analysis of any currently existing acquisition opportunity.  The following areas 
are recommended for further research in the area of collaborative acquisition: 
-Analyze the advantages and disadvantages of collaboration with Japan in a 
specific program using the researcher's model (e.g. use the MMA/P-X programs). 
-Analyze the impacts of current U.S. and Japanese policies on the acquisition 
environment. 
-Develop an alternative model for assessing collaboration with Japan that 
emphasizes current U.S. - Japan policy imperatives and strategic military considerations. 
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-Conduct a comparison of how the U.S. conducts collaboration with countries 
other than Japan (e.g. E.U.) and identify strengths and weaknesses in the current U.S. - 
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APPENDIX A - TEN THINGS PROGRAM MANAGERS SHOULD 
KNOW ABOUT THE JDIB 
1.  Twelve companies in the JDIB account for approximately 95% of all Japanese defense 
contracts. 
 
2.  Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) is the lead producer of Japanese defense 
equipment and is Japan's only producer of fixed-wing aircraft. 
 
3.  Japanese defense firms function in an essentially non-competitive environment. 
 
4.  The Three Principles on Arms Exports limit the JDIB to almost purely internal 
defense production.  As a matter of policy, Japan does not export defense-related items. 
 
5.  The JDIB competes for a total acquisition budget of approximately $9 billion 
(procurement and R&D).  Most contracts come from the Japanese Defense Agency. 
 
6.   Japan procures its defense equipment from five sources:  (1) domestic development, 
(2) co-development with the United States, (3), Licensed Production, (4) Commercial 
Imports, and (5) Foreign Military Sales (FMS). 
 
7.  The most likely areas for acquisition opportunities are in co-development, Licensed 
Production, and FMS.   
 
8.  Japan purchases most of its defense imports from the U.S. but companies within the 
JDIB do pursue limited projects with other countries (e.g. the E.U.). 
 
9.  The JDIB is heavily involved in aerospace R&D and views aerospace R&D as the 
most prolific area for commercial application spin-offs. 
 
10.  Initial evaluation of collaboration opportunities with the JDIB should be undertaken 

























APPENDIX B - SUMMARY OF COOPERATIVE U.S. - JAPAN 
RESEARCH PROJECTS 
(1)  Ducted Rocket Engine.  This first JDA-DoD cooperative R&D project was 
established in 1992.  The $30M, five year US Army/Technical Research and 
Development Institute (TRDI) project developed and ground tested a flight–weight 
ducted rocket engine with potential application to surface to air missile systems.  US 
Army Missile Command and TRDI each contracted with domestic firms for engine 
components, fuel, and testing components (Nissan, Nippon Oils & Fats, Alliant Tech 
Systems, and UTC participated); final integration and testing was conducted by 
MICOM and TRDI.  The program was completed in 1999.   
 
(2)  Advanced Steel Technology.  Established in 1995, this $35M US Navy/TRDI 
project aims to develop new methods for welding high strength steels using under-
matched welding techniques.  Potential applications for the DOD include aircraft carrier 
and submarine hull construction.  Each side is fabricating test articles, conducting tests on 
its own and the other side’s test articles, and sharing technical information.  Industry 
participants are MHI, KHI, Nippon Steel, USX, Lukens, Bethlehem Steel, Oregon Steel.  
Several government labs and universities are also involved. 
 
(3)  Fighting Vehicle Propulsion using Ceramic Materials.  Established in 1995, 
this $25M US Army TACOM/TRDI project aims to develop breakthrough diesel 
engine technology for ground vehicles with emphasis on high power density and low 
fuel consumption through the use of ceramic materials.  Industry participants are 
Isuzu, MHI, Cummins Engine Company, Caterpillar Inc., and Detroit Diesel 
Corporation.  Each side is constructing a one-cylinder test engine and will share 
technical information, test results, and components. 
 
(4)  Eye-Safe Laser Radar.  Established in 1996, this $20M US Army 
CECOM/TRDI project is developing and testing a demonstrator multifunction eye-
safe laser radar system capable of range finding, range mapping, target profiling, and 
obstacle warning and avoidance. 
 
(5) ACES II Ejection Seat Modification.  Established in 1998, this $50M 
USAF/Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) project is developing and evaluating a 
modification kit for the ACES II ejection seat used in F-15 and other aircraft.  The kit 
will increase the stability of the seat and reduce limb flailing to reduce injury potential 
in high-speed ejections.  The modification will also increase the anthropometrical 
dimensions that the seat can safely accommodate. Contractors include MHI, Daicel 
and Boeing. 
 
(6)  Advanced Hybrid Propulsion Technologies.  Established in 1998, this $18M 
USAF/TRDI project is conducting research and exploratory development of advanced 
hybrid rocket engine propulsion to increase the performance, safety, and reliability of 
future tactical missiles.  The project will develop liquid oxidizers, gas generator fuels, 
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flow control systems, combustion technology, and other supporting technology.  This 
will enable demonstration of a forward injected gas generator hybrid rocket engine 
with energy management capability. 
 
(7)  Shallow Water Acoustic Technologies (SWAT). Established in 1999, this $2-
3M US Navy/ TRDI project will formulate an exchangeable data base and explore 
interoperable system concepts in the areas of environmental measurement, sound 
propagation/reverberation modeling, and signal processing/artificial intelligence in 
shallow water environments.  
 
(8)  Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense Research: Established in 1999, this $70M 
program is performing requirements analysis and design for anti-ballistic missile 
components.  The potential application for this work is the future SM-3 Block II 
missile associated with the Navy Theater Wide system.  Research is focused on the 
Sensor, Advanced Kinetic Warhead, Propulsion, and Lightweight Nosecone.   
 
(9)  Low Vulnerability Ammunition (LOVA).  This just-initiated $1.5 - 2M program 
between the US Army and TRDI seeks to develop low cost, reduced sensitivity 
energetics for use as propellant in artillery systems.  This program will involve 
exchanges of energetic plasticizers and the propellant cellulose acetate nitrate, 
formulations work, and characterization of the physical and chemical properties of the 
samples.  The Army and TRDI would conduct testing in a small caliber gun and aging 
studies, as well as bullet impact, fast cook off, and fragment impact tests. 
 
From:  Ref. 39 pp. 3-4. 
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APPENDIX C-TOP TEN U.S. AND JAPANESE DEFENSE FIRMS IN 
198214 













4 Tenneco Inc. Ishikawajima-
Harima Heavy 
Industries 
5 Raytheon Co. Toshiba Corp. 














10 The Boeing Co. Komatsu Corp 
 
 
  *Merged with Boeing Co. 
**Merged with Lockheed Corp. 
 
From:  Ref. 12 p. 21 and Ref. 21 p. 94. 
                                                 


















APPENDIX D - ROOTS TO FRUITS MODEL OF JAPANESE 
AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
Figure 2.   Roots to Fruits Model of Japanese Aerospace Industry 





















APPENDIX E - PROS AND CONS OF COLLABORATIVE 
PROGRAMS 
 
 Type of Program 
Objective Reciprocal Trade 
Cooperative 
Productiona Co-development 
Economic Pro:  Specialization by U.S. and 
partners increases size of market 
and reduces costs. 
 
Con:  U.S. loses R&D and 
production capabilities for 
weapons outside area of 
specialization. 
Pro:  Specialization of 
production, larger market 
reduces costs while U.S. 
still able to maintain 
R&D and some 
production capability. 
 
Con:  Duplication of 
production, small size, 
and inexperience of 
partners raise costs for 
U.S. 
Pro:  Shared costs of 
R&D and production, 
larger market to reduce 
costs, allowing U.S. to 
maintain wider range of 
R&D and production 
capabilities. 
 
Con:  Unintentional 
transfer of technology 
may harm more 
advanced U.S. industry.  
Greater risk of cost 
growth and schedule 
slippage 
Operational Pro:  U.S. and partners share 
common equipment. 
 
Con:  U.S. requirements 
compromised; independent U.S. 
capability diminished 




Con:  Significant 
difference between 
models produced by 
partners 




Con:  U.S. requirements 
compromised; 
independent U.S. 
capability diminished.  
Significant difference 
between models 
produced by partners 
Political Pro:  Partners strengthen political 
ties through military reliance.  
Common equipment encourages 
shared training and doctrine 
 
Con:  Compromised 
requirements, loss of independent 
capability strain political ties 
Pro:  U.S. able to 
influence partners' 
defense postures.  
Common equipment 
encourages shared 
training and doctrine. 
 




Pro:  Better than 
partners developing 
independent R&D 
capability.  Common 
equipment encourages 
shared training and 
doctrine. 
 
Con:  Compromised 
requirements, loss of 
independent capability 
strain political ties 
 
aAssumes licenser is United States 

















APPENDIX F - ASSESSEMENT TOOL FOR EVALUATION OF 
ACQUISITION OPPORTUNITES WITH JAPAN 
(GENERIC FORMAT)  






Minimize Cost (33.2%)  
Share RDT&E Costs 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Gain Economies of Scale 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Take Adv. of the Kokusanka Effect 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximize Tech. Trans. Costs and Ben. 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Integrate Comm. Items and Best Prac. 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
Subtotals 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Minimize Schedule Risk (22.6%)  
Min. Sched. Risks in Bilateral RDT&E 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Take Advantage of JDIB Proficiency 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Create Positive Congressional Interest 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Integrate Comm. Items and Best Prac. 0% 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
     
Subtotals 0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximize Performance (44.2%)  
Use Shared RDT&E 50% 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Enhance Interoperability 10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Integrate Comm. Items and Best Prac. 40% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Subtotals 100% 22.10 2.87 0.00 0.00 


















APPENDIX G - FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES HIERACHY FOR 


































APPENDIX H - SCALING TECHNIQUE FOR RATIO 
COMPARISON 
1.  To scale the utility assessments so that they range from 0 to 1 the first step is to 
develop two equations that represent and high and low values of the initial assessment 
(this example uses the values from the text): 
0  =  a + b(0) 
0 = a + b(75) 
2.  The second step is to solve these two equations simultaneously for the constants (a) 
and (b):  a = 0,  b = 1/75 
3.  The third step is to apply these scaling constants to calculate the utility value for each 
collaboration alternative: 
UtilityCo-Dev = 0 + 75/75 = 1.0 
UtilityLic. Prod. = 0 + 10/75 = 0.13 
UtilityFMS = 0 + 0/75 =  0 
UtilityDo not Coll. = 0 + 0/75 = 0 
4.  The final step is to transfer these scaled utilities to the tool. 




















































APPENDIX J - WEIGHTING AND UTILITY CALCULATIONS FOR 
FS-X SAMPLE APPLICATION 
 Utilities of Alternatives   
Objectives % Codevel. Licensed 
Prod. 
FMS Do not 
Collab. 
Minimize Cost (33.2%)     
Share RDT&E Costs 8.3% 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 
Gain Economies of Scale 8.3% 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.11 
Take Adv. of the Kokusanka Effect 41.7% 1.00 0.75 0.38 0.00 
Maximize Tech. Trans. Costs and Ben. 33.3% 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.70 
Integrate Comm. Items and Best Prac. 8.3% 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
      
Subtotals 100% 15.00 15.70 18.75 7.27 
Minimize Schedule Risk (22.6%)     
Min. Sched. Risks in Bilateral RDT&E 5.6% 0.00 1.00 0.81 0.50 
Take Advantage of JDIB Proficiency 33.3% 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.00 
Create Positive Congressional Interest 55.6% 0.00 0.00 0.78 1.00 
Integrate Comm. Items and Best Prac. 5.6% 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
      
Subtotals 100% 2.22 8.90 14.56 11.68 
Maximize Performance (44.2%)     
Use Shared RDT&E 31.3% 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
Enhance Interoperability 62.5% 0.10 0.50 1.00 0.00 
Integrate Comm. Items and Best Prac. 6.3% 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
Subtotals 100% 6.28 31.28 39.08 0.00 
Weighted Utility Score 23.50 55.87 72.38 18.95 




WEIGHTS FOR FUNDAMENTAL AND
DETAILED OBJECTIVES
  




    
Fundamental
Objective
Outcome Rank Rate Weight




















  Total 200 100%





Outcome Rank Rate Weight
(Benchmark) No Objective Realized 6 0 N/A
Share RDT&E Costs RDT&E costs shared,
Worst on all others
4 20 8.3%
Gain Economies of 
Scale 
Realize EOS, Worst on
all others
3 20 8.3%







Trans. Costs and Ben. 
Tech Transfer Costs and




Items and Best Prac. 
Comm. Items and Prac.
integrated, Worst on all
others
5 20 8.3%









Outcome Rank Rate Weight
(Benchmark) No Objective Realized 5 0 N/A
Minimize Schedule 
Risks in Bilateral 
RDT&E  
RDT&E schedule risks
minimized, Worst on all
others
3 10 5.6%













Items and Best Prac. 
Comm. Items and Prac.
integrated, Worst on all
others
4 10 5.6%
  Total 180 100%





Outcome Rank Rate Weight
(Benchmark) No Objective or Realized 4 0 N/A
Use Shared RDT&E 
to Max. Perf. 
RDT&E used to max.










Items and Best Prac. 
Comm. Items and Prac.
integrated, Worst on all
others
3 10 6.3%
  Total 160 100%







RATIO SCORING OF DETAILED 
OBJECTIVES ON EACH 
ALTERNATIVE 
    
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Minimize 
Cost 




Costs        








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Minimize 
Cost 
       
Detailed 
Objective: 
Gain Economies of 
Scale        








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Minimize 
Cost 
       
Detailed 
Objective: 
Take Advantage of the 
Kokusanka Effect       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 




Objective:   
Minimize 
Cost 
       
Detailed 
Objective: 
Maximize Tech. Trans. 
Costs and Ben.       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Minimize 
Cost 
       
Detailed 
Objective: 
Integrate Comm. Items 
and Best Prac.       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Minimize 
Schedule Risk 
      
Detailed 
Objective: 
Minimize Schedule Risks in 
Bilateral RDT&E       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 













Objective:   
Minimize 
Schedule Risk 
      
Detailed 
Objective: 
Take Advantage of JDIB 
Proficiency       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Minimize 
Schedule Risk 




Congressional Interest       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Minimize 
Schedule Risk 
      
Detailed 
Objective: 
Integrate Comm. Items 
and Best Prac.       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 













Objective:   
Maximize 
Performance 
      
Detailed 
Objective: 
Use Shared RDT&E to 
Max. Perf.       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Maximize 
Performance 




Interoperability        








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
Scaled Utility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 High Score 1 b = 1.00 
         
Fundamental 
Objective:   
Maximize 
Performance 
      
Detailed 
Objective: 
Integrate Comm. Items 
and Best Prac.       








Constants   
Unscaled 
Utility 0 0 0 0 
Low 
Score 0 a = 0.00 
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